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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Since 2007, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 
one of the principal statutes enabling U.S. economic sanctions, has prohibited 
any party from causing a violation of any license, order, regulation, or prohi-
bition issued under its authority.1 When this statutory requirement appears in 
regulatory text, however, it does so in two different forms. More commonly, 
this prohibition is framed in general terms applicable to “[a]ny transaction,” 
but sometimes this same restriction is phrased as applicable only to “[a]ny 
transaction by a U.S. person or within the United States.”2 This difference in 
phrasing may appear minor and indeed, the U.S. Department of the Treasury 
does not seem to have intended to create two versions of the causation lan-
guage having distinct meanings. The broader form of this language, however, 
has been used on at least one occasion as the basis for government enforce-
ment against non-U.S. parties based solely on the use of U.S. dollars in trans-
actions with a sanctioned party that would be prohibited if performed by a 
U.S. party.3 Where the broad causation provision has been used in this way, 
the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) within the U.S. Department of 
the Treasury based its theory of liability on the foreign party having caused a 
U.S. entity to violate the sanctions regulations by way of the U.S. entity par-
ticipating in the dollar clearing process.4 
Part I of this Article discusses the different versions of the causation pro-
visions found within the sanctions regulations and examines their relationship 
to relevant statutes and Executive Orders. Part II reviews how a broad causa-
tion provision was used as the basis for the government enforcement action 
brought by OFAC against CSE Global Limited and its subsidiary CSE 
TransTel Pte Ltd. (TransTel). It also examines how OFAC has also brought 
enforcement actions in the past based on similar facts but based instead on a 
theory of export of financial services from the United States, either directly or 
indirectly. This Article argues that the government’s use of the causation pro-
visions therefore does not constitute an entirely new area of enforcement, even 
though different regulatory provisions are used as the stated basis. Part III 
explores the nature of U.S. dollar clearing and settlement, both in U.S. and 
 
 1 International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. § 1705(a) (1977). 
 2 31 C.F.R. § 544.205 (2018). U.S. persons are generally defined in the OFAC regula-
tions to include both individuals and entities. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 535.308 (1980). 
 3 Settlement Agreement Between U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets 
Control and CSE Global Limited and CSE TransTel Pte. Ltd. (July 15, 2017), https://www. 
treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/CivPen/Documents/transtel_settlement.pdf [here-
inafter TransTel Settlement Agreement]. 
 4 Id. 
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offshore payment systems, and concludes that U.S. dollar-denominated trans-
actions generally do require the involvement of a U.S. party and thus neces-
sarily cause a sanctions violation where the broad version of the causation 
language is present or where a theory of indirect export of financial services 
is used. Part IV analyzes how OFAC has publicized prohibitions concerning 
the use of U.S. dollars in transactions with sanctioned entities and discusses 
how those legal requirements might be made clearer and more broadly under-
standable in the future. Finally, Part V recommends that the causation provi-
sions be made consistent and standardized into the more expansive form in 
order to create transparency around the applicability of U.S. sanctions to trans-
actions involving U.S. dollars. 
II.  BACKGROUND AND APPLICABLE LEGAL PROVISIONS 
The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) within the U.S. Department 
of the Treasury was created in 1950 and administers U.S. economic and trade 
sanctions.5 Previously, asset controls were administered by the Office of For-
eign Funds Control, created in 1940.6 OFAC’s authority to control assets is 
based on several statutes, including among others the International Emer-
gency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA); the Trading With the Enemy Act 
(TWEA); the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (FNKDA); and the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).7 
IEEPA was enacted in 1977.8 The statute “grants the President extensive 
power to regulate a variety of economic transactions during a state of emer-
gency.”9 Pursuant to IEEPA, the President may declare a national emergency 
to exercise powers under IEEPA “to deal with any unusual or extraordinary 
threat, which has its source in whole or in substantial part outside of the United 
States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United 
States.”10 A list of Executive Orders (mainly issued under the authority of 
IEEPA) relevant to the scope of this Article is detailed in the table found in 
Part I.A.ii. 
 
 
 
 5 About, Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://w 
ww.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/pages/office-of-foreign-assets-con 
trol.aspx (last updated Apr. 5, 2019, 5:53 PM). 
 6 Id. 
 7 31 C.F.R. pt. 501, app. A (2018). 
  8 CHRISTOPHER A. CASEY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45618, THE INTERNATIONAL 
EMERGENCY ECONOMIC POWERS ACT: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND USE 2 (2019), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R45618.pdf. 
 9 Id. 
 10 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (1977). 
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A. Prohibitions Against “Causing a Violation” 
 
The laws, regulations, and orders governing U.S. sanctions may prohibit 
not only certain types of conduct, but also, as described below, actions which 
cause a violation of any of the terms of particular U.S. sanctions programs. 
Such language is the subject of this Article and is referred to herein as “cau-
sation provisions” or “causation language.” Causation language appears 
within the IEEPA statute itself (within the section describing penalties), as 
well as in two different forms of regulatory prohibitions and in the penalties 
sections of certain sanctions regulations.11 The different forms of the causa-
tion language are described in Section I.A.ii. of this Article. 
 
i. Statutory Language 
 
Currently, 50 U.S.C. § 1705 (“Penalties”) states under paragraph (a) that 
“[i]t shall be unlawful for a person to violate, attempt to violate, conspire to 
violate, or cause a violation of any license order, regulation, or prohibition 
issued under” Chapter 35 of Title 50 of the U.S. Code, namely IEEPA. This 
specific language was added to the statute through the IEEPA Enhancement 
Act, enacted in 2007.12 Paragraph (c) allows for a fine or imprisonment for 
any person “who willfully commits, willfully attempts to commit, or willfully 
conspires to commit, or aids and abets in the commission of, an unlawful act 
described in subsection (a).” The IEEPA Enhancement Act also increased the 
maximum civil penalty for violations of IEEPA, from $50,000 to $250,000 
per violation, and also raised the maximum criminal penalty from $50,000 to 
$1,000,000 per violation.13 The 2007 amendments also added conspiracy to 
violate any IEEPA license, order, regulation, or prohibition as an act prohib-
ited under the statute.14 
The Penalties section of the original 1977 statute provided for the imposi-
tion of a civil penalty “on any person who violates any license, order, or reg-
ulation issued under this title,” or a criminal fine or term of imprisonment 
upon “[w]hoever willfully violates any license, order, or regulation issued 
 
 11 50 U.S.C. § 1705(a). 
 12 Brad S. Karp et al., OFAC Breaks New Ground by Penalizing Non-U.S. Companies 
for Making U.S. Dollar Payments Involving a Sanctioned Country, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON 
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Aug. 16, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/0 
8/16/ofac-breaks-new-ground-by-penalizing-non-u-s-companies-for-making-u-s-dollar-p 
ayments-involving-a-sanctioned-country/. 
   13 New Legislation Increases Penalties Under the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act, GIBSON DUNN (Oct. 16, 2007), https://www.gibsondunn.com/new-legislation 
-increases-penalties-under-the-international-emergency-economic-powers-act/. 
 14 CASEY, supra note 8, at 12. 
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under this title.”15 Causation and conspiracy were not in themselves included 
as prohibited acts.16 While language was added to the Penalties section in 
other amendments made to IEEPA between the enactment of the statute in 
1977 and the passage of the IEEPA Enhancement Act in 2007 (for example, 
allowing a civil penalty to be assessed for attempts to violate the statute), the 
imposition of liability for causing a violation did not appear until the 2007 
revisions.17 
The causation language in the 2007 IEEPA Enhancement Act was in the 
version of the bill passed by the Senate and subsequently the House of Rep-
resentatives.18 The Senate Committee Report does not specifically address 
why the causation language was being added to IEEPA, but instead com-
mented generally on the intent of the IEEPA Enhancement Act to strengthen 
the penalties available for violations of IEEPA, as “current penalties [were] 
neither adequate nor proportionate in many cases, for deterring companies 
from investing in bad actors.”19 
 
ii. Regulatory Language 
 
The regulations implementing the various OFAC sanctions programs are 
set forth in Title 31. Many of these sanctions programs contain some type of 
provision prohibiting individuals and other entities from causing a violation 
of that particular sanctions program (or in some cases, of any license, order, 
or prohibition issued under IEEPA). This causation language appears in prin-
cipally two different forms across different sanctions programs. One version 
of this language is as follows: “Any transaction by a U.S. person or within the 
United States that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, 
causes a violation of, or attempts to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in 
this part is prohibited.”20 In the table below, this language is denoted as “lim-
ited,” since it applies only to the conduct of U.S. persons or to actions taken 
within the United States. As described in the table below, this limited causa-
tion language appears in the Syrian and Zimbabwean sanctions regulations. 
A different version of the causation language appears in a larger number 
of sanctions programs: “Any transaction . . . that evades or avoids, has the 
purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate 
 
 15 International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 206, 
91 Stat. 1626 (1977) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1705). 
 16 Id. 
 17 50 U.S.C. § 1705. 
 18 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1708 (2007). 
 19 S. Rep. No. 110-82 (2007). 
 20 31 C.F.R. § 542.205(a) (2014). 
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any of the prohibitions set forth in this part is prohibited.”21 In the table below, 
this type of language is described as “expansive” because its reach is not lim-
ited to actions taken by U.S. persons or within the U.S. This Article also refers 
to this version as “broad” causation language. 
Some sanctions programs contain neither type of language, but instead al-
low for the imposition of penalties for causing a violation of IEEPA.22 This 
language is similar to the expansive causation language and is as follows: “A 
civil penalty not to exceed the amount set forth in Section 206 of the Act may 
be imposed on any person who violates, attempts to violate, conspires to vio-
late, or causes a violation of any license, order, regulation, or prohibition is-
sued under the Act.”23 In the table below, this form of language is also de-
scribed as “expansive,” but the fact that the language appears in the penalties 
section of the sanctions program, rather than as a separate prohibition, is noted 
next to the regulatory citation. 
The following table summarizes the type of causation language appearing 
in each U.S. sanctions program, along with the corresponding executive order 
and the year of that order: 
Sanc-
tions 
Program 
Type of 
“causing a 
violation” 
language 
in E.O. 
E.O. and 
year 
Type of 
“causing 
a viola-
tion” lan-
guage in 
regula-
tion 
Regulation cite 
(within Title 31 
of the Code of 
Federal Regula-
tions) 
North 
Korea 
Expansive 
(13810, 
13687 & 
13722); 
limited 
(13570 & 
13551); 
none 
within 
13466 
E.O.s 13466 
(2008); 13551 
(2010); 13570 
(2011); 13687 
(2015); 13722 
(2016); 13810 
(2017) 
Expan-
sive 
§ 510.212 (Imple-
mented in current 
form March 5, 
2018; 83 Fed. 
Reg. 9182) 
Cuba None E.O 12854 
(1993) 
None n/a 
Iranian 
Assets 
None E.O.s 12170 
(1979), 12205 
(1980), 12211 
Expan-
sive 
§ 535.701 (penal-
ties) (June 10, 
 
 21 31 C.F.R. § 560.203(a) (2012). 
   22 See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 535.701 (2008). 
 23 See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. §561.07(a)(3) (2012). 
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(1980), 12276 
(1981), 12279 
(1981), 12280 
(1981), 12281 
(1981), 12282 
(1981), 12283 
(1981), 12294 
(1981) 
2008; 73 Fed. 
Reg. 32652) 
Narcotics None E.O. 12978 
(1995)24 
Expan-
sive 
§ 536.701 (penal-
ties) (June 10, 
2008; 73 Fed. 
Reg. 32652) 
Weapons 
of Mass 
Destruc-
tion 
Trade 
Control 
None E.O.s 12938 
(1994); 13094 
(1998); 
Expan-
sive 
§ 539.701 (penal-
ties) (June 10, 
2008; 73 Fed. 
Reg. 32652) 
Zimba-
bwe 
None E.O.s 13469 
(2008); 13391 
(2005); 13288 
(2003) 
Limited 
in 
541.204 
and ex-
pansive 
penalties 
§ 541.204 (July 
29, 2004; 69 Fed. 
Reg. 45246) & § 
541.207 (June 10, 
2008; 73 Fed. 
Reg. 32652) 
Syria Limited E.O. 13582 
(2011) 
Limited 
in 
542.205 
and ex-
pansive 
penalties 
§ 542.205 (2005) 
& § 542.701 (pen-
alties) (June 10, 
2008; 73 Fed. 
Reg. 32652) 
Darfur None E.O. 13400 
(2006) 
Expan-
sive 
§ 546.701 (penal-
ties) (May 28, 
2009; 74 Fed. 
Reg. 25430) 
 
 24 Counter Narcotics Trafficking Sanctions, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://www.t 
reasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/programs/pages/narco.aspx (last updated Aug. 21, 
2019, 10:20 AM). 
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Demo-
cratic 
Republic 
of the 
Congo 
Expansive 
(13671); 
none in 
original 
E.O. 
E.O.s 13413 
(2006); 13671 
(2014)25 
Expan-
sive 
§ 547.20526 (Nov. 
15, 2018; 83 Fed. 
Reg. 57308) 
Belarus None E.O. 13405 
(2006) 
Expan-
sive 
§ 548.701 (penal-
ties) (February 3, 
2010; 75 Fed. 
Reg. 5502)   
Lebanon None E.O. 13441 
(2007) 
Expan-
sive 
§ 549.701 (penal-
ties) (July 30, 
2010; 75 Fed. 
Reg. 44907) 
Somalia Limited E.O. 13536 
(2010) 
None n/a 
Yemen Expansive E.O. 13611 
(2012) 
None n/a 
Central 
African 
Republic 
Expansive E.O. 13667 
(2014) 
None n/a 
Burundi Expansive E.O. 13712 
(2015) 
None n/a 
South 
Sudan 
Expansive E.O. 13664 
(2014) 
None n/a 
Iranian 
Transac-
tions 
None 
(12613, 
12957, 
E.O.s 12613 
(1987); 12957 
(1995); 12959 
Expan-
sive 
§ 560.203 & § 
560.701 (penal-
ties)27 (June 10, 
 
 25 Democratic Republic of the Congo Sanctions, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,  https://w 
ww.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/pages/drc.aspx (last updated Nov. 
15, 2018, 4:58 PM). 
 26 31 C.F.R. § 547.205 (2018). 
 27 31 C.F.R. § 560.701(a)(3) (as amended in 2019) states: 
As set forth in section 218 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human 
Rights Act of 2012 (Pub. L. 112-158), a civil penalty not to exceed the 
amount set forth in section 206 of IEEPA may be imposed on a United 
States person if an entity owned or controlled by the United States person 
and established or maintained outside the United States violates, attempts 
to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of the prohibition set 
forth in § 560.215 or of any order, regulation or license set forth in or 
issued pursuant to this part concerning such prohibition. The penalties 
set forth in this paragraph shall not apply with respect to a transaction 
described in § 560.215 by an entity owned or controlled by the United 
States person and established or maintained outside the United States if 
the United States person divests or terminates its business with the entity 
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12959, 
13059); 
Limited 
(13599); 
Expansive 
(13268) 
(1995); 13059 
(1997); 13599 
(2012); 13268 
(2012) 
2008; 73 Fed. 
Reg. 32652) 
Iranian 
Financial 
None 
(12957); 
Limited 
(13599); 
Expansive 
(13622, 
13628) 
E.O.s 12957 
(1995), 13599 
(2012), 13622 
(2012), 13628 
(2102) 
Expan-
sive 
§ 561.205 & § 
561.701(a)(1) & 
(3) (penalties) 
(Aug. 16, 2010) 
(75 Fed. Reg. 
49836) (addi-
tional, limited 
penalties in (a)(2)) 
Iranian 
Human 
Rights 
Limited E.O. 13553 
(2010) 
None n/a 
Hizbol-
lah Fi-
nancial 
None E.O.s 12947 
(1995); 13099 
(1998); 13224 
(2001); 13268 
(2001); 13372 
(2005)28 
Expan-
sive 
§ 566.202 & § 
566.701 (penal-
ties) (Apr. 15, 
2016; 81 Fed. 
Reg. 22185) 
Libya Limited E.O. 13566 
(2011) 
None n/a 
Iraq sta-
bilization 
and in-
surgency 
None E.O.s 13303 
(2003), 13315 
(2003), 13350 
(2004), 13438 
(2007), 13668 
(2014) 
Expan-
sive 
§ 576.701 (penal-
ties) (Sept. 13, 
2010) (75 Fed. 
Reg. 55463) 
Cyber-
related 
Expansive E.O. 13694 
(2015) 
None n/a 
Foreign 
Interfer-
ence in 
Expansive E.O. 13848 
(2018) 
None n/a 
 
not later than February 6, 2013, such that the U.S. person no longer owns 
or controls the entity, as defined in § 560.215(b)(1). 
 28 Counter Terrorism Sanctions, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,  https://www.treasury.go 
v/resource-center/sanctions/programs/pages/terror.aspx (last updated Sept. 12, 2019, 1:06 
PM). 
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U.S. 
Elections 
Nicara-
gua 
Expansive E.O. 13851 
(2018) 
None n/a 
Global 
Magnit-
sky 
Expansive E.O. 13818 
(2017) 
Refer-
ence 
within 
E.O.s 
only 
n/a 
Magnit-
sky Act 
n/a n/a Expan-
sive 
§ 584.205 & § 
584.701 (penal-
ties) (both Dec. 
21, 2017; 82 Fed. 
Reg. 60507) 
Western 
Balkan 
Stabiliza-
tion 
None E.O.s 13304 
(2001); 13219 
(2001)29 
Expan-
sive 
§ 588.701 (penal-
ties) (June 10, 
2008; 73 Fed. 
Reg. 32652) 
Ukraine Expansive E.O.s 13660, 
13661, 13662 
(2014) 
Refer-
ence 
within 
E.O.s 
only 
Apps. A, B, C to 
Part 589 
Transna-
tional 
Criminal 
Organi-
zations 
Limited E.O. 13581 
(2011) 
Refer-
ence 
within 
E.O. only 
App. A to Part 590 
Vene-
zuela 
Expansive E.O. 13692 
(2015) 
Refer-
ence 
within 
E.O. only 
App. A to Part 591 
Rough 
dia-
monds 
None E.O. 13312 
(2003)30 
None n/a 
 
 29 Balkans-Related Sanctions, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/r 
esource-center/sanctions/programs/pages/balkans.aspx (last updated July 26, 2019, 2:49 
PM). 
 30 Rough Diamond Trade Controls, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://www.treasury. 
gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/pages/diamond.aspx (last updated Mar. 28, 2019, 
12:21 PM). 
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Global 
Terror-
ism 
None E.O.s 12947 
(1995); 13099 
(1998); 13224 
(2001); 13268 
(2001); 13372 
(2005)31 
Expan-
sive 
§ 594.701 (penal-
ties) (June 10, 
2008; 73 Fed. 
Reg. 32652) 
Terror-
ism 
None E.O.s 12947 
(1995); 13099 
(1998); 13224 
(2001); 13268 
(2001); 13372 
(2005)32 
Expan-
sive 
§ 595.701 (penal-
ties) (June 10, 
2008; 73 Fed. 
Reg. 32652) 
Terror-
ism List 
Govern-
ments 
n/a n/a None n/a 
Foreign 
Terrorist 
Organi-
zations 
None E.O.s 12947 
(1995); 13099 
(1998); 13224 
(2001); 13268 
(2001); 13372 
(2005)33 
None n/a 
Foreign 
Narcotics 
Kingpin 
None N/A (regula-
tions imple-
mented King-
pin Act, 21 
U.S.C. §§ 
1901-1908 
and 8 U.S.C. § 
1182)34 
None n/a 
 
In addition, the Sudanese sanctions regulations have now been revoked, 
but contained an expansive version of the causation language in the penalties 
section only, added in 2008. Similar language appeared in the relevant penal-
ties sections of the Burmese, Taliban (Afghanistan), Yugoslavia/Bosnia, for-
mer Liberian regime of Charles Taylor and highly enriched uranium sanctions 
 
 31 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 28. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, NARCOTICS SANCTIONS PROGRAM (2014), https: 
//www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/drugs.pdf. 
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regulations, among others.35 Executive Order 13882, announcing Mali-related 
sanctions on July 26, 2019, contained a broad causation provision.36 
 
iii. Analysis of Regulatory Language 
 
As a preliminary point, the broad version of the causation language, 
whether in place as a separate prohibition or in a penalties section, appears 
much more frequently across OFAC sanctions programs than does the more 
limited causation language. Only the Syria and Zimbabwe sanctions programs 
contain the limited version of the causation language, although the limited 
causation language also appears in certain Executive Orders related to addi-
tional sanctions programs (such as Somalia, Libya, and transnational criminal 
organizations, among others).37 There does not appear to be a relationship be-
tween the overall restrictiveness of a sanctions program and the specific type 
of causation language used within that program. The Syrian sanctions pro-
gram, for example, “is one of the most comprehensive sanctions programs 
currently implemented by OFAC,” and contains blanket restrictions on the 
“exportation, reexportation, sale or supply of” services into Syria.38 Despite 
this, the Syrian sanctions regulations contain the limited type of causation lan-
guage. Other sanctions programs only target certain named individuals but 
nonetheless use the expansive causation language (such as, for example, the 
Western Balkan stabilization program).39 
It is not entirely clear why these differences in causation language appear 
across sanctions programs, across Executive Orders, and between authorizing 
Executive Orders and regulatory language related to the same sanctions pro-
gram. More recent regulations and Executive Orders seem to more frequently 
contain expansive causation language as a separate prohibition.40 One event 
explains the timing of the expansive penalties language: the 2007 enhance-
ments to the IEEPA Act changed the penalties sections, described above, to 
include penalties for causation actions where no such liability had explicitly 
 
 35 31 C.F.R. § 537 (2016) (Burmese); 31 C.F.R. §545 (2009) (Taliban); 31 C.F.R. § 586 
(2000) (Yugoslavia/Bosnia); 31 C.F.R. § 593 (2016) (Former Liberian Regime of Charles 
Taylor). 
 36 Exec. Order. No. 13882, 3 C.F.R. § 5(a) (2019). 
 37 31 C.F.R. § 542.205 (2014) (Syria); 31 C.F.R. § 541.204 (2006) (Zimbabwe); Exec. 
Order No. 13,536, 75 Fed. Reg. 19,869 (Apr. 12, 2010) (Somalia); Exec. Order No. 13,566, 
76 Fed. Reg. 11,315 (Feb. 25, 2011) (Libya); Exec. Order No. 13,581, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,757 
(July 24, 2011) (transnational criminal organizations). 
 38 OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, SYRIA SANCTIONS PROGRAM (2013), https://ww 
w.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/syria.pdf (citing Exec. Or-
der No. 13582, 76 Fed. Reg. 52,209 (Aug. 22, 2011)). 
 39 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 29. 
 40 See generally sanction chart, supra pp. 35-41. 
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existed in those penalties sections before.41 Namely, before the IEEPA En-
hancement Act was passed, the relevant penalty section (e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 
538.701) provided that “[a] civil penalty not to exceed $50,000 per violation 
may be imposed on any person who violates any license, order, or regulation 
issued under the Act.” The language was amended by the IEEPA Enhance-
ment Act42 to state that “[a] civil penalty not to exceed the amount set forth in 
Section 206 of the Act may be imposed on any person who … causes a viola-
tion of any license, order, regulation, or prohibition issued under” IEEPA. All 
the instances of expansive causation language that appear in the penalties sec-
tions of sanctions programs were added after the time of the IEEPA Enhance-
ment Act. These sections appear to have been added with the intent of penal-
izing actions causing violations of any of the prohibitions of IEEPA, and there 
is no evidence to suggest an intent to implement these penalties provisions in 
order to widen the jurisdictional reach of the sanctions regulations beyond 
what the limited version of the causation language was intended to address (as 
discussed in greater detail below). 
There does not appear to be any relationship between the type of causation 
language that appears in an Executive Order and that appearing in the corre-
sponding regulatory language. For example, the Zimbabwe sanctions regula-
tions contain a limited causation provision, but no reference to causation was 
made in the corresponding Executive Orders.43 The causation language that 
appears in the authorizing Executive Order44 related to the Iranian Transac-
tions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR)45 is limited; the causation language 
within the ITSR themselves, however, is expansive. The fact that the ITSR 
Executive Order with its limited causation language was translated into the 
more general provision in the ITSR might indicate that the two versions were 
intended to have the same effect–namely, to be limited to U.S. persons and 
U.S. transactions–and that the omission of the limiting language in the ITSR 
was not intended to have a practical difference as to the reach of that section. 
The theory that the two forms of causation provisions were intended to 
have the same jurisdictional reach (namely, to actions taken by U.S. persons 
or within the United States) is further supported by the Federal Register No-
tice in which the causation provision in the North Korean sanctions regula-
tions, which appears in the broader form, is nevertheless discussed as being 
 
 41 See, e.g., 73 Fed. Reg. 32,652 (June 10, 2008) (“OFAC is amending the current 
IEEPA-based sanctions programs regulations to reflect the revised description of unlawful 
acts and the revised penalties prescribed by the Act”). 
 42 IEEPA Civil and Criminal Penalties, 31 C.F.R. §537.701(a)(1) (2008). 
 43 See Exec. Order No. 13,288, 68 Fed. Reg. 11,457 (Mar. 6, 2003); Exec. Order No. 
13,391, 70 Fed. Reg. 71,201 (Nov. 22, 2005); Exec. Order No. 13,469, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,841 
(July 25, 2008); cf. 31 C.F.R. § 541.204. 
 44 Exec. Order No. 13,599, 77 Fed. Reg. 6659 (2012). 
 45 31 C.F.R. § 560. 
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limited to transactions by U.S. persons or within the United States.46 Specifi-
cally, 31 C.F.R. § 510.212 (within the North Korean sanctions regulations) 
itself includes the expansive causation language.47 However, the Federal Reg-
ister Notice amending the North Korean sanctions regulations comments that 
“[s]ection 510.212 further contains the additional prohibition, included in all 
but the first order but available for all IEEPA-based prohibitions, on any trans-
action by a U.S. person or within the United States that causes a violation of 
any of the prohibitions in any of the orders.”48 This perhaps indicates that at 
the time of the amendment of the North Korean sanctions regulations, OFAC 
considered the expansive prohibition language to be a prohibition relating 
only to transactions by a U.S. person or occurring within the United States.49 
Moreover, the fact that the Zimbabwean and Syrian sanctions regulations 
contain a limited causation provision as a separate prohibition but expansive 
causation language within their respective penalties section seems to indicate 
that the presence of expansive language in the penalties section is not neces-
sarily intended to extend potential liability to actions taken outside of the 
United States or by persons outside of the United States. The expansive lan-
guage of the penalties section might not necessarily extend the jurisdictional 
reach of a limited causation provision which appears as a separate prohibition. 
The broad and limited causation provisions appear to constitute a different 
set of legal requirements despite having been intended to have the same effect, 
namely, to be limited to actions taken within the United States or by U.S. 
parties. The broad causation provisions appear to have been drafted as a sort 
of shorthand version of the more limited causation language. Despite the clues 
noted above as to the intent of the drafters, it seems (as described within this 
Article) that OFAC currently interprets the sanctions causation provisions ac-
cording to their plain text. This next Part of this Article explores the principles 
that appear to govern OFAC’s use of the causation principles as the basis for 
government enforcement of the sanctions regulations. Part II also discusses 
an alternative theory of liability used by OFAC with respect to the use of U.S. 
dollars overseas in transactions with sanctioned parties. 
 
 46 83 Fed. Reg. 9182 (Mar. 5, 2018); cf. 31 C.F.R. §510.212 (2018). 
 47 31 C.F.R. §510.212 (2018). 
 48 North Korean Sanctions Regulations, 83 Fed. Reg. 9182, 9182-83 (Mar. 5, 2018) 
(amending the North Korean sanctions regulations contained at 31 C.F.R. § 510 and reis-
suing them in their entirety) (emphasis added). 
 49 It should be noted, however, that the TransTel settlement (discussed in greater detail 
in Part II.A), in which a broad causation provision was used to support a theory of liability 
based on actions taken outside the United States. and by non-U.S. entities, had occurred 
nearly eight months earlier, in July 2017. It is possible that the division of OFAC respon-
sible for the TransTel settlement was not fully aligned with the division of the office re-
sponsible for the amendment of the North Korean sanctions regulations. It is also possible 
that, for some reason, OFAC saw a difference in jurisdictional reach between the North 
Korean sanctions regulations and the ITSR (although that difference is not reflected in any 
textual difference in the causation provisions of these programs). 
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III.  OFAC ENFORCEMENT: CAUSATION PROVISIONS AND OTHER 
MECHANISMS 
Regardless of the type of conduct the broad causation language was origi-
nally meant to encompass, the expansive causation language has since been 
used by OFAC as the basis for enforcement against conduct taken outside the 
United States and by non-U.S. parties, based on the nexus of U.S. financial 
institutions being involved during the course of U.S. dollar transactions.50 
This Part describes the background of the TransTel settlement and the legal 
theory of causation upon which OFAC described TransTel’s liability. This 
Part also discusses other OFAC enforcement actions that were brought under 
similar, but slightly different, legal theories and facts, including cases brought 
under the theory of indirect export of financial services from the United States 
and that of causing a violation by U.S. financial institutions through more ac-
tive concealment of the involvement of a sanctioned entity. As such, this Ar-
ticle proposes that OFAC’s use of the broad causation provisions did not pe-
nalize a type of conduct that it had not already exercised jurisdiction over by 
other means. The other actions discussed in this Part besides TransTel were 
all brought against financial institutions, however, and the use of the causation 
provisions might therefore constitute a new tool for OFAC to penalize differ-
ent types of actors for their use of the U.S. dollar in connection with transac-
tions with sanctioned parties. Finally, this Part examines how the nature of 
OFAC enforcement through an alternative theory of liability may render 
transactions with sanctioned parties violations of the OFAC regulations even 
 
 50 TransTel Settlement Agreement, supra note 3; Settlement Agreement Between U.S. 
Dep’t of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and Lloyds TS Bank, PLC (Dec. 
22, 2009), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Doc 
uuments/lloyds_agreement.pdf [hereinafter Lloyds Settlement Agreement]; Settlement 
Agreement Between U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and 
Credit Suisse AG (Dec. 16, 2000), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/santions/OF 
AC-Enforcement/Documents/12162009.pdf [hereinafter Credit Suisse AG Settlement 
Agreement]; Settlement Agreement Between U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury’s Office of For-
eign Assets Control and BNP Paribas SA 8 (Jun. 30, 2014), https://www.treasury.gov/r 
esource-center/sanctions/OFACEnforcement/Pages/20140630.aspx [hereinafter BNP 
Paribas SA 8 Settlement Agreement]; Settlement Agreement Between U.S. Dep’t of the 
Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and Barclays Bank PLC (Feb. 8, 2016), 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFACEnforcement/Pages/20160208. 
aspx [hereinafter Barclays Settlement Agreement]; Settlement Agreement Between U.S. 
Dep’t of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and UniCredit Bank AG at ¶5 
(Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/CivPen/Documents/2 
0190415_unicredit_bank_ag.pdf [hereinafter UniCredit Bank AG Settlement Agreement]; 
Settlement Agreement Between U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Con-
trol and Standard Chartered Bank (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-cen-
ter/sanctions/CivPen/Documents/scb_settlement.pdf [hereinafter Standard Chartered Bank 
Settlement Agreement]. 
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in the context of sanctions programs with the limited version of the causation 
language. 
 
A. Enforcement Actions 
 
i. TransTel 
 
The TransTel settlement stemmed from an enforcement action brought by 
OFAC against CSE Global Limited (“CSE”) and its wholly-owned subsidiary, 
CSE TransTel Pte. Ltd. (“TransTel”).51 TransTel was based in Singapore and 
supplied telecommunications to the oil and gas sector.52 TransTel allegedly 
“entered into contracts with, and received purchase orders from, multiple Ira-
nian companies” (at least two of which were contained on OFAC’s Specially 
Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) List).53 TransTel also hired 
Iranian companies to provide goods and services in connection with these 
contracts and purchase orders.54 According to OFAC, between June 2012 and 
March 2013, TransTel originated 104 funds transfers relating to Iran or Ira-
nian persons in some way, totaling $11,111,812 from its account denominated 
in U.S. dollars at a non-U.S. financial institution based in Singapore.55 All of 
these funds transfers “were processed through the United States and caused 
multiple financial institutions–including several U.S. financial institutions–to 
engage in the prohibited exportation or re-exportation of financial services 
from the United States to Iran.”56 OFAC alleged that on this basis, and because 
TransTel appeared to have “explicit knowledge and reason to know” of the 
Iranian connection with respect to these transactions, TransTel appeared to 
have violated § 1705(a) of IEEPA (making it unlawful for a person to violate 
or cause a violation of any IEEPA prohibition or regulation) and/or § 560.203 
of the ITSR (the ITSR causation provision).57 Pursuant to the July 2017 set-
tlement agreement, CSE and TransTel agreed to pay a total penalty of approx-
imately $12 million to OFAC.58 
The TransTel settlement was widely regarded as being based on a new type 
of jurisdictional theory–namely, the use of the causation provisions to hold a 
non-U.S. party responsible for violations of U.S. sanctions based solely on its 
 
 51  TransTel Settlement Agreement, supra note 3. 
   52  Id. 
   53  Id. 
   54   Id. 
  55  Id. 
   56  Id. 
   57  Id. 
   58  Id. 
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use of the U.S. dollar.59 However, as described below, the TransTel settlement 
was perhaps a logical extension of, and conceptually very similar to, prior and 
subsequent OFAC cases in which foreign parties were penalized for directly 
or indirectly exporting financial services from the United States to sanctioned 
parties or countries. 
 
ii. Lloyds 
 
In December 2009, OFAC entered into a settlement agreement with Lloyds 
TSB Bank, plc (“Lloyds”), a financial institution organized under the laws of 
England and Wales.60 Lloyds participated in conduct including “intentionally 
manipulating and deleting information in wire transfer instructions executed” 
on behalf of Iranian customers and those in Sudan and Libya; this “policy of 
manipulating information in wire transfer instructions was memorialized in 
writing and approved by senior managers within Lloyds.”61 Thus, according 
to the settlement, at least 4,200 electronic transfers were routed by Lloyds “to 
or through third-party banks located in the United States, in apparent violation 
of IEEPA and OFAC regulations related to Iran, Sudan, and Libya.”62 These 
violations did not involve either of Lloyds’ two U.S. branches. 
The settlement agreement described that the apparent violations involved 
the following: 
(1) the exportation of services by Lloyds from the United 
States to Iran or the Government of Iran; (2) the exportation of 
services by Lloyds from the United States to Sudan or the Gov-
ernment of Sudan; (3) the transfer, payment, exportation, with-
drawal, or other dealings by Lloyds in property or interests in 
property of the Government of Sudan that were in or came 
within the United States; and (4) the transfer, payment, expor-
tation, withdrawal, or other dealings by Lloyds in property or 
interests in property of the Government of Libya that were or 
came within the United States during the pendency of U.S. 
sanctions against Libya.63 
 
   59  See, e.g., OFAC Pushes New Limits on Jurisdiction of U.S. Sanctions by Penalizing 
Non-U.S. Companies for “Causing” Violations by U.S. Dollars Payments, AKIN GUMP 
(Aug. 10, 2017) https://www.akingump.com/en/news-insights/ofac-pushes-new-limits-on- 
jurisdiction-of-u-s-sanctions-by.html; see also Karp et al., supra note 12. 
 60 Lloyds Settlement Agreement, supra note 50. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
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This matter therefore involved a sanctions program in which no causation 
provision was present (Libya); one in which the causation provision appeared 
in broad form but only in the penalties section (Iran); and one in which there 
was a separate causation prohibition (Iran). Causation was nowhere men-
tioned in the Lloyds settlement agreement as a basis of liability, but the con-
cept of causing U.S. financial institutions to commit U.S. sanctions violations 
appeared to form the basis for this enforcement action. Indeed, a 2009 article 
noted that the Lloyds case “appear[ed] to mark the first time the DOJ . . . as-
serted jurisdiction over a non-U.S. person whose conduct occurred entirely 
outside the United States, but which caused OFAC violations by a non-affili-
ated U.S. person.”64 Moreover, “the stripping of transactions by Lloyds ap-
pears to have occurred without any participation by its U.S. affiliates or em-
ployees,” and as such “the only link between Lloyds and the United States 
appears to have been the transmittal of payment instructions to U.S. financial 
institutions, which in turn violated OFAC sanctions, albeit unknowingly, by 
processing those requests.”65 
Thus, while TransTel was not a financial institution as was Lloyds, the 
essential theory of liability–causing U.S. financial institutions to process 
transactions involving U.S.-sanctioned parties–was essentially the same. The 
TransTel case, therefore, did not necessarily introduce an entirely novel the-
ory of liability in the form of causation. As described in the cases below, 
OFAC continued to use the theory of export of financial services as the basis 
for enforcement actions both before and after the TransTel settlement was en-
tered into. 
 
iii. Credit Suisse 
 
Also in 2009, OFAC, the U.S. Department of Justice, and the New York 
County District Attorney’s Office entered into a settlement agreement with 
Credit Suisse AG for a total of $536 million.66 The Credit Suisse matter in-
volved allegations that Credit Suisse had “engaged in payment processes that 
prevented U.S. financial institutions from identifying the involvement of U.S. 
sanctions targets in funds transfers processed to and through the United 
States.”67 Among other allegations, these payment processes included the fol-
lowing types of conduct: 
 
 64 New Enforcement Action Highlights Potential OFAC Risks for Non-U.S. Financial 
Institutions, CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN & HAMILTON LLP (Jan. 14, 2009), https://www.clear 
ygottlieb.com/news-and-insights/publication-listing/new-enforcement-action-highlights-p 
otential-ofac-risks-for-non-us-financial-institutions22?search=. 
 65 Id. 
 66 U.S. Treasury Dep’t Announces Joint $536 Million Settlement with Credit Suisse AG, 
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (Dec. 16, 2009), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press 
-releases/Pages/tg452.aspx. 
 67 Credit Suisse AG Settlement Agreement, supra note 50. 
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[O]mitting or removing information referencing sanctioned lo-
cations, entities or individuals; forwarding payment messages 
to U.S. financial institutions that referenced Credit Suisse as 
the ordering institution and that omitted the identity of the ac-
tual originating bank; filling the field on Society for World-
wide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (“SWIFT”) pay-
ment messages that indicated the originator or replacing the 
names of ordering customers on such payment messages with 
references to Credit Suisse or with phrases such as “Order of 
a Customer’; and using cover payments to avoid referencing 
parties subject to U.S. sanctions.68 
Credit Suisse’s conduct was alleged to have violated the OFAC prohibi-
tions against the “exportation, . . . directly or indirectly, from the United 
States, . . . of any services to Iran or the Government of Iran”69 through pro-
cessing electronic funds transfers through financial institutions located in the 
United States. Credit Suisse was also alleged to have violated similar prohibi-
tions with respect to Burma, Sudan, Cuba, Libya, and Liberia, based on the 
same type of conduct.70 This enforcement action was not based on the causa-
tion provisions themselves, but as was the case in the Lloyds settlement, was 
based instead on the OFAC regulations prohibiting the export of financial ser-
vices to sanctioned parties, directly or indirectly, from the United States.71 
However, as was also the case for the Lloyd and TransTel settlements, the type 
of action penalized in this settlement was that of causing U.S. financial insti-
tutions to violate the sanctions regulations by providing financial services to 
sanctioned parties.72 
 
iv. BNP Paribas 
 
BNP Paribas, BA (BNPP) entered into a combined $8.9 billion state and 
federal settlement in June 2014, $963 million of which was with OFAC.73 As 
part of the settlement, BNPP was “restricted from performing certain dollar-
clearing functions through its New York office for a period of a year starting 
 
   68  Id. 
   69  Id. (citing 31 C.F.R. § 560.204 (2011)). 
   70  Id. 
   71  Id. 
   72  Id. 
   73  BNP Paribas Agrees to Plead Guilty and to Pay $8.9 Billion for Illegally Processing 
Financial Transactions for Countries Subject to U.S. Economic Sanctions, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE (June 30, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bnp-paribas-agrees-plead-guilty- 
and-pay-89-billion-illegally-processing-financial. 
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in January 2015.”74 BNPP was alleged to have violated the Sudanese Sanc-
tions Regulations, the ITSR, the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, and the 
Burmese Sanctions Regulations.75 
According to the settlement agreement with OFAC, “BNPP processed 
thousands of transactions to or through U.S. financial institutions that in-
volved countries, entities, and/or individuals subject to the sanctions programs 
administered by OFAC.”76 In the course of those transactions, BNPP was al-
leged to have “engaged in a systematic practice, spanning many years and 
involving multiple BNPP branches and business lines, that concealed, re-
moved, omitted, or obscured references to, or the interest or involvement of, 
sanctioned parties in U.S. Dollar (USD) Society for Worldwide Interbank Fi-
nancial Telecommunication (SWIFT) payment messages sent to U.S. finan-
cial institutions.”77 These actions included “omitting references to sanctioned 
parties; replacing the names of sanctioned parties with BNPP’s name or a code 
word; and structuring payments in a manner that did not identify the involve-
ment of sanctioned parties in payments sent to U.S. financial institutions.”78 
Therefore, OFAC alleged that BNPP appeared to have conveyed the services 
of U.S. banks to recipients in sanctioned parties, and directly or indirectly ex-
ported financial services to those parties.79 
Moreover, legal advice provided to BNPP indicated that non-U.S. 
branches of foreign banks were prohibited from processing sanctions-related 
transactions through the U.S. The opinion noted: “if the use of the unaffiliated 
[U.S.] bank were perceived to result from an effort by the foreign bank to 
avoid the involvement of its U.S. branch in handling prohibited transactions, 
there is a substantial risk either that regulators or prosecutors” would argue 
that the foreign bank was a covered person under the CACR or the ITSR, or 
that such a transaction would be considered a prohibited evasion under those 
sanctions programs.80 This legal opinion therefore indicates that even prior to 
the time of the BNPP settlement in 2014, BNPP’s legal counsel understood 
that causing U.S. financial institutions to handle transactions that involved 
sanctioned parties would be prohibited by OFAC. The TransTel settlement of 
2017, then, did not introduce an entirely new prohibition against involving 
 
 74 Andrew R. Johnson, 5 Things on Dollar Clearing and BNP Paribas, WALL ST. J. 
(June 30, 2014), https://blogs.wsj.com/briefly/2014/06/30/5-things-on-dollar-clearing-and 
-bnp-paribas/. 
 75 Enforcement Information for June 30, 2014, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, https://www.tr 
easury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/CivPen/Documents/20140630_bnp.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 11, 2019). 
 76 BNP Paribas SA 8 Settlement Agreement, supra note 50. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
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U.S. financial institutions in transactions with U.S.-sanctioned parties by way 
of dollar clearing and settlement. 
 
v. Barclays 
 
In 2016, OFAC entered into a $2.4 million settlement with Barclays Bank 
PLC for processing dollar-denominated transactions for Barclays Bank of 
Zimbabwe Limited (BBZ) involving entities owned over 50% by SDNs.81 
OFAC’s 50% Rule treats an entity as a blocked person when it is owned in 
the aggregate, directly or indirectly, 50% or more by one or more blocked 
persons.82 BBZ’s sanctions screening system had shortcomings that did not 
allow it to  “effectively capture or otherwise identify all of its customers’ ben-
eficial owners in the bank’s electronic system.”83 As a result of this deficiency, 
BBZ maintained U.S. dollar accounts for three corporate customers that were 
blocked by way of the 50% Rule, although not themselves specifically named 
to the SDN List, and BBZ “continued to process USD transactions for or on 
their behalf to or through the United States in apparent violation of the ZSR.”84 
Approximately $3.375 million in transactions were processed to or through 
financial institutions located in the United States, including Barclay’s New 
York Branch, on behalf of BBZ.85 OFAC found that these 159 funds transfers 
“conferred economic benefit to, and provided indirect access to the U.S. fi-
nancial system for, blocked persons, causing harm to the Zimbabwe sanctions 
program and its associated policy objectives.”86 Given that Zimbabwe is one 
of the two sanctions programs containing the limited version of the causation 
language, OFAC’s theory of liability would most likely have to have been 
based on the export of financial services to Zimbabwe rather than on the cau-
sation language. Such transactions could only be sanctionable by OFAC under 
a causation theory if they had been effected in the United States or by a U.S. 
person. 
 
 
 
 
 81 Jessica Piquet Megaw, OFAC Penalizes Barclays for Zimbabwe Sanctions Violations, 
STEPTOE INT’L COMPLIANCE BLOG (Feb. 23, 2016), https://www.steptoeinternationalcompl 
ianceblog.com/2016/02/ofac-penalizes-barclays-for-zimbabwe-sanctions-violations/. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Enforcement Information for February 8, 2016, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, https://ww 
w.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/CivPen/Documents/20160208_barclays.pdf 
(last visited Nov 11, 2019). 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
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vi. UniCredit 
 
In April 2019, OFAC entered into a settlement totaling $611 million with 
three UniCredit Group banks located in Germany, Austria, and Italy.87 A re-
lated cease and desist order in an action before the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System noted that these overseas offices “processed certain 
U.S. dollar-denominated funds transfers” through their own U.S. branch as 
well as other unaffiliated U.S. financial institutions.88 The UniCredit overseas 
offices, moreover, omitted relevant information from payment messages that 
prevented their U.S. branch and the other U.S. financial institutions from de-
termining that their carrying out these transactions would result in violations 
of the OFAC regulations.89 
Specifically, UniCredit Bank AG operated U.S. dollar accounts on behalf 
of Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) (Iran’s national maritime 
carrier, blocked pursuant to Executive Order 13599, among other provi-
sions90) and other companies owned or affiliated with IRISL.91 Moreover, 
separately from these actions, UniCredit Bank AG’s head office, several 
branches, and a subsidiary “appear to have employed a practice of processing 
USD payments through financial institutions in the United States on behalf of 
persons subject to other U.S. sanctions programs in a manner that did not dis-
close the interest of the sanctioned parties from U.S. financial institutions.”92 
Public statements made by U.S. government officials in connection with 
this settlement reiterated that the UniCredit Group banks had used the U.S. 
financial system in connection with transactions with sanctioned parties. Sigal 
P. Mandelker, then-Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence 
in the U.S. Department of the Treasury, noted that “UniCredit Group banks 
routed transactions through the United States in a non-transparent manner, 
when those payments would have been blocked or rejected if their true nature 
had been clear, in violation of multiple sanctions programs.”93 OFAC Director 
Andrea M. Gacki noted that OFAC would “continue to investigate institutions 
that utilize the U.S. financial system in a manner that undermines U.S 
 
 87 U.S. Treasury Announces Settlement with UniCredit Group Banks, U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY (Apr. 15, 2019), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm658. 
 88 Order to Cease and Desist and Order of Assessment of a Civil Money Penalty Issued 
Upon Consent Pursuant to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, as Amended, Docket Nos. 
19-017-B-FB, 19-017-CMP-FB, (Fed. Res. Bd. of Governors) (Apr. 15, 2019), available 
at https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/enf20190415a1.pdf. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), IRAN WATCH (Dec. 10, 2018), https:/ 
/www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/islamic-republic-iran-shipping-lines-irisl. 
 91 UniCredit Bank AG Settlement Agreement, supra note 50. 
 92 Id. at ¶ 26. 
 93 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 87. 
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sanctions programs.”94 As these statements indicate, the allegations that the 
UniCredit banks had caused U.S. financial institutions to violate the OFAC 
sanctions regulations were an important part of the facts of this matter, even 
if OFAC did not pursue this action based on the causation provision itself. 
The facts of this case are different from those of the TransTel matter, be-
yond the identity of the UniCredit banks as financial institutions while 
TransTel was not, in that the UniCredit banks acted willfully and fraudulently 
in conducting some of the activities described in the settlement agreement, as 
they intentionally hid the presence of sanctioned parties in USD transactions. 
For example, the charged conduct included UniCredit Bank AG’s processing 
of “USD payments in a non-transparent manner – for example, by confirming 
that payment instructions did not include references to U.S.-sanctioned per-
sons and countries – through financial institutions in the United States on be-
half of persons subject to the WMDPSR and other U.S. sanctions programs.”95 
Causation was not specifically referenced by OFAC as a basis of the 
UniCredit enforcement action. Instead, the settlement agreement referenced 
the various prohibitions against the export of services and transaction with 
blocked persons.96 The language within the settlement agreement describing 
UniCredit activities, however, does indicate UniCredit’s role in causing U.S. 
parties to violate OFAC sanctions regulations.97 Thus, the type of conduct pe-
nalized was essentially the same as that which could have been penalized un-
der a broad version of the causation provision instead. 
 
vii. Standard Chartered 
 
Also in April 2019, OFAC entered into a settlement agreement with Stand-
ard Chartered Bank (Standard Chartered), a financial institution organized un-
der the laws of England and Wales with a branch office in New York.98 OFAC 
had previously entered into a 2012 settlement with Standard Chartered Bank 
for violations of the ITSR, the Syrian Sanctions Regulations, the Libyan Sanc-
tions regulations, the Burmese Sanctions Regulations, and the Foreign Nar-
cotics Kingpin Sanctions Regulations, as the bank “engaged in payment prac-
tices that impaired compliance with U.S. economic sanctions by financial 
 
 94 Id. 
 95 Enforcement Information for April 15, 2019, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, https://www.tr 
easury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/CivPen/Documents/20190415_uni_webpost.pdf 
(last visited Nov 11, 2019). 
 96 Id. at 95 at ¶¶ 35-45. 
 97 “It appears that UWC [unit of UniCredit responsible for financial sanctions compli-
ance] employees understood their U.S. correspondents had obligations pursuant to U.S. 
sanctions laws not to process certain transactions involving sanctioned entities or inter-
ests.” Id. at ¶ 30. 
   98 Standard Chartered Bank Settlement Agreement, supra note 50. 
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institutions in the United States,” including by Standard Chartered’s U.S. 
branch in New York.99 The April 2019 settlement agreement stated that 
“OFAC determined that the transactions [Standard Chartered] processed to or 
though the United States” involving certain corporate entities initiating pay-
ment instructions from Iran “constitute[d] apparent violations of § 560.204 of 
the ITSR,” namely, the prohibitions on the exportation, reexportation, sale, or 
supply of goods, technology, or services to Iran.100 Again, as in the matters 
described above besides TransTel, OFAC based the 2019 Standard Chartered 
enforcement action against a financial institution on the prohibitions against 
the export of services to Iran, but the conduct penalized was conceptually the 
same as actions prohibited under the broad version of the causation provision. 
 
B. Analysis 
 
i. Causation vs. Export of Financial Services as a Basis for Liability 
 
The TransTel settlement was seen as a new area of enforcement due to 
OFAC’s use of a causation provision as a basis for liability, but the novelty of 
the TransTel enforcement action was perhaps due more to OFAC’s specific 
citation of that language as the theory of liability rather than OFAC’s use of 
an entirely new area of enforcement conceptually. Indeed, a 2016 Southern 
District of New York opinion cited the following contention that the U.S. gov-
ernment made in one of its filings for that case: “[i]t has been clear for a long 
time that foreign nationals are not permitted to use the U.S. financial system 
to conduct transactions that are for the benefit of Iran or for the government 
of Iran.”101 The court did not specify exactly how long this rule had been clear, 
but the 2016 opinion did predate the 2017 TransTel settlement agreement. 
Thus, the enforcement stance in TransTel could not have by itself created a 
novel blanket prohibition against the use of the U.S. financial system with 
respect to Iran or other comprehensively sanctioned countries. 
Further, the other enforcement actions described above were also brought 
by OFAC based on prohibited uses of the U.S. dollar in transactions with 
sanctioned parties, even if the prohibited conduct was characterized as directly 
or indirectly exporting financial services instead of causing others to violate 
the sanctions regulations. The TransTel settlement thus perhaps constituted a 
novel case because of the specific provision used by OFAC as the basis for 
that enforcement action, but not due to any novel prohibition in the type of 
conduct prohibited by the sanctions regulations. Causation, even where not 
specifically referenced by OFAC in enforcement actions other than the 
 
 99 Id. at ¶ 4. 
 100 Id. at ¶ 43. 
 101 United States v. Zarrab, No. 1:15-cr-000867, 2016 WL 6820737, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 17, 2016). 
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TransTel case, nevertheless played an important role in those fact patterns; 
many of the financial institutions in the settlements described above were pe-
nalized for their role in causing the funds transfers made by unrelated U.S. 
financial institutions and omitting or deleting information that would have 
prevented those U.S. financial institutions from committing sanctions viola-
tions. Whether OFAC’s theory of liability was based on the causation provi-
sions as in TransTel, or on the indirect export of financial services to blocked 
parties, the end result was the same: a non-U.S. party was held responsible for 
causing U.S. financial institutions to process U.S. dollar-denominated trans-
actions involving blocked parties. 
There are, however, certain factors that distinguish TransTel and its cau-
sation theory of liability from the other (both earlier and later) OFAC enforce-
ment actions discussed within this Part and the concept of export of financial 
services from the United States. Most notably, neither CSE Global nor its sub-
sidiary TransTel were financial institutions, as were the alleged wrongdoers 
in the other OFAC enforcement actions discussed. Thus the TransTel case 
represented a new type of action not because the causation theory was inher-
ently different from the theory of export of financial services to a sanctioned 
party, but because the party against whom the enforcement action was brought 
played a different role in the transaction and was not directly involved in the 
dollar clearing and settlement process, other than entering into the relevant 
U.S. dollar-denominated transactions. 
A theory of causation was perhaps necessary for OFAC to bring the 
TransTel enforcement action, or was at least better-suited to that particular 
matter, because a theory of export of financial services would be even more 
attenuated where the respondent was not itself a financial institution or in-
volved in the dollar-clearing process. While TransTel and the financial insti-
tutions discussed above both actively omitted identifying details that would 
have allowed U.S. financial institutions to recognize that the transactions in-
volved a sanctioned party, the omissions made by TransTel were less directly 
tied to the dollar clearing and settlement process, since TransTel itself did not 
directly take part in the payment process. Likewise, other differences between 
TransTel and the other alleged sanctions violators that might explain why 
OFAC used a causation theory instead that of export of financial services in-
cluded the financial sophistication of the parties, size of their operations, 
closer ties with U.S. financial institutions, knowledge of the dollar clearing 
process, and potential level of control over the dollar clearing process. While 
on a practical level, the nature of the conduct penalized was the same, OFAC 
might have chosen to base its enforcement action in TransTel on the causation 
language, rather than on the export of services prohibitions, based on these 
factors. 
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ii. Prohibitions on the Direct or Indirect Export of Financial Services 
and Practical Effect on Differences in Causation Provisions 
 
The fact that OFAC has brought enforcement actions based on a theory of 
export of financial services on multiple occasions raises the question of 
whether the availability of this enforcement mechanism subsumes any differ-
ences between the broad and limited causation language. The Syria and Zim-
babwe sanctions programs, which are the only sanctions programs with lim-
ited causation provisions appearing as separate prohibitions, do contain 
prohibitions against the export of services from the United States or by a U.S. 
person to sanctioned parties (and with respect to Syria, against the export of 
services to anywhere in Syria).102 Although these two sanctions programs ex-
pressly limit the reach of their causation provisions to actions taken within the 
United States or to conduct by U.S. parties, OFAC could theoretically bring 
an enforcement action where facts exist similar to the TransTel matter, but 
based on a theory of export of financial services to parties sanctioned under 
the Syrian or Zimbabwean sanctions programs. The practical effect of the dif-
ference in causation language, then, would be minimized; the same type of 
conduct (the use of U.S. dollars by foreign parties in transactions with OFAC-
sanctioned individuals and entities) could be reached regardless of the absence 
of a broad causation provision in the Syrian or Zimbabwean sanctions pro-
grams. 
A key question, then, is whether OFAC would consider the type of conduct 
in TransTel to be equally reachable by way of a theory of export of financial 
services. Was the choice of the causation provision as the basis for liability 
made because OFAC did not consider a theory of export of financial services 
as applicable where the foreign party was not a financial institution? The an-
swer to that question will depend on the nature of future enforcement actions 
brought by OFAC and on which theories of liability OFAC chooses to base 
those cases. In addition, in the enforcement actions described above that were 
brought after the TransTel settlement, OFAC continued to rely on a theory of 
export of services to sanctioned entities or countries, rather than basing such 
enforcement actions principally on the causation provisions as it had done in 
TransTel.103 Therefore, it remains to be seen whether OFAC’s use of the cau-
sation provision in TransTel as a basis for enforcement constitutes a new trend 
in sanctions enforcement, or whether TransTel will remain an outlier with re-
spect to OFAC’s use of a broad causation provision to reach transactions out-
side of the United States entered into by non-U.S. parties who are not financial 
institutions. 
 
 102 Prohibitions to Syria, 31 C.F.R. § 542.207 (2014); Prohibited Transactions to Syria, 
31 C.F.R. § 542.201 (2014); Prohibited Transactions to Zimbabwe, 31 C.F.R. § 541.201 
(2014). 
   103 TransTel Settlement Agreement, supra note 3. 
56 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. [Vol. 48:29 
 
IV.  U.S. DOLLAR CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT 
This Part examines the nature of dollar clearing and settlement as related 
to dollar-denominated transactions made both within the United States and 
overseas. In doing so, this Article seeks to identify potential U.S. nexuses that 
could support OFAC’s use of the causation provisions to reach as far as pro-
hibiting the use of U.S. dollars in the transactions of foreign entities with U.S.-
sanctioned parties, whether those U.S. dollars are held at U.S. or non-U.S. 
financial institutions. Both the limited and the expansive causation provisions 
require the involvement of a U.S. party or some action having been taken 
within the United States or by a U.S. party, however tangentially, in order for 
a foreign party to incur a violation based on causation (although this factor is 
necessary, but not sufficient, for a theory of liability using the limited causa-
tion provisions).104 Therefore, the identification of those parties who can be 
involved in U.S. dollar clearing transactions is helpful to determine under 
which circumstances foreign parties may or may not use U.S. dollars for trans-
actions involving blocked or sanctioned parties. This Article concludes in this 
Part that U.S. parties do appear to be in fact involved, however tangentially, 
in U.S. dollar clearing and settlement processes even when offshore clearing 
systems are used in a particular transaction, and thus a broad causation provi-
sion or a theory of export of financial services could be used as the basis for 
OFAC enforcement with respect to any U.S. dollar-denominated transaction 
with a U.S.-sanctioned party.105 
As discussed in the previous Part, a theory of export of financial services 
might be a tenable theory of liability based on the export of financial services 
even if a particular sanctions program at issue contains a limited, rather than 
expansive, causation provision. The availability of this alternative theory of 
liability therefore narrows the practical effect of the disparity in causation pro-
visions in most U.S. dollar transactions. Identifying which parties may cause 
a sanctions violation, however, is important to understanding the extent to 
which OFAC may employ broad causation provisions as an enforcement tool 
in the future and also to the ways in which the theory of export of financial 
services may be used in connection with U.S. dollar-denominated transac-
tions. 
 
 
 
 104 See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 542.205 (2014) (Syria, limited); 31 C.F.R. § 547.205 (Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo, broad). 
 105 See generally TransTel Settlement Agreement, supra note 3; Lloyds Settlement 
Agreement, supra note 50; Credit Suisse AG Settlement Agreement, supra note 50; BNP 
Paribas SA 8 Settlement Agreement, supra note 50; Barclays Settlement Agreement, supra 
note 50; UniCredit Bank AG Settlement Agreement, supra note 50; Standard Chartered 
Bank Settlement Agreement, supra note 50. 
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A. Methods of U.S. Dollar Clearing 
 
The process of “[d]ollar clearing involves the conversion of payments on 
behalf of clients into U.S. dollars from a foreign currency.”106 “Clearing” is 
“the process of transmitting, reconciling, and in some cases confirming pay-
ment orders or security transfer instructions prior to settlement, possibly in-
cluding the netting of instructions and the establishment of final positions for 
settlement.”107 There are three main steps in clearing: “processing payment 
instruments, delivering them to paying banks, and calculating interbank pay-
ment obligations.”108 Settlement is the act that discharges the payment obli-
gations in respect of funds or securities.109 
CHIPS (owned by commercial banks and supervised by the U.S. Federal 
Reserve) and FedWire (operated by the U.S. Federal Reserve) are the two 
major U.S. payment systems, and are described in greater detail below.110 To 
dollar clear in the United States, foreign banks do not need have banking op-
erations in the United States, “but whichever bank they use to do so must be 
a customer of either the private sector-owned Clearing House Interbank Pay-
ment System [CHIPS] or the Federal Reserve’s Fedwire Funds Service [Fed-
wire].”111 
 
i. Fedwire 
 
The Fedwire Funds Service (Fedwire) operates as a real-time gross settle-
ment system and “is generally used to make large-value, time-critical pay-
ments.”112 Fedwire is used “to make cash concentration payments, to settle 
commercial payments, to settle positions with other financial institutions or 
clearing arrangements, to submit federal tax payments or to buy and sell 
 
 106 Johnson, supra note 74. 
 107 Morten L. Bech et al., Settlement Liquidity and Monetary Policy Implementation—
Lessons From the Financial Crisis, FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV., Mar. 2012, at 1, 2. 
 108 Bruce J. Summers & R. Alton Gilbert, Clearing and Settlement of U.S. Dollar Pay-
ments: Back to the Future?, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. Sept./Oct. 1996, at 3, 6. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Karen Freifeld et al., Exclusive: BNP Asks Other Banks for Help as Dollar Clearing 
Ban Nears, REUTERS (Oct. 6, 2014, 7:20 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bnp-pari 
bas-clearing/exclusive-bnp-asks-other-banks-for-help-as-dollar-clearing-ban-nears-idUS 
KCN0HV28C20141006. 
 111 Duncan Kerr, Clearing: European Banks Weigh up US Dollar Clearing Options, 
EUROMONEY, (Jan. 5, 2015), https://www.euromoney.com/article/b12kjyygbzp9v4/clearin 
g-european-banks-weigh-up-us-dollar-clearing-options. 
 112 Fedwire Funds Services, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., https://www. 
federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/fedfunds_about.htm (last updated Feb. 19, 2014). 
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federal funds.”113 Fedwire is operated by the U.S. Federal Reserve Banks114 
and operates in the following manner: 
When sending a payment order to the Fedwire Funds Service, 
a Fedwire participant authorizes its Federal Reserve Bank to 
debit its master account for the amount of the transfer. If the 
payment order is accepted, the Federal Reserve Bank holding 
the master account of the Fedwire participant that is to receive 
the transfer will credit the same amount to that master ac-
count.115 
Foreign banks that are Fedwire participants “can send and receive pay-
ments directly via Fedwire using the SWIFT international messaging116 ser-
vice.”117 Foreign banks that are not Fedwire participants “can send payments 
via a US bank or another foreign bank that is a Fedwire participant,” using 
correspondent banking.118 Correspondent banking, generally, is defined as “an 
arrangement under which one bank (correspondent) holds deposits owned by 
other banks (respondents) and provides payment and other services to those 
respondent banks.”119 Correspondent banking “requires the opening of ac-
counts by respondent banks in the correspondent banks’ books and the ex-
change of messages to settle transactions by crediting and debiting those ac-
counts.”120 
In 2018, Fedwire originated approximately 158.4 million transactions val-
ued at approximately $716.2 trillion. 121 
 
 113 Fedwire Funds Service, THE FEDERAL RESERVE, https://www.frbservices.org/assets/fi 
nancial-services/wires/funds.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2019). 
 114 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 112. 
 115 Fedwire Funds Service, supra note 113. 
 116 SWIFT is “the global provider of secure financial messaging services,” connecting 
11,000 institutions over more than 200 countries and territories. About Us, SWIFT, 
https://www.swift.com/about-us (last visited Oct. 24, 2019). In 1977, the SWIFT messag-
ing system replaced the Telex technology used by banks to communicate instructions for 
cross-border transactions. Discover SWIFT: Messaging and Standards, SWIFT, 
https://www.swift.com/about-us/discover-swift/messaging-standards (last visited Oct. 24, 
2019). 
 117 Frances Coppola, Fedwire: The US Dollar in International Payments, AMERICAN 
EXPRESS, https://www.americanexpress.com/us/foreign-exchange/articles/fedwire-us-doll 
ar-in-international-payments/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2019). 
 118 Id. 
 119 BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, COMM. ON PAYMENTS & MKT. INFRASTRUCTURES, 
CORRESPONDENT BANKING  (2016), https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d147.pdf. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Fedwire Funds Service—Annual, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., https 
://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/fedfunds_ann.htm (last updated Feb. 7, 2019). 
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ii. CHIPS 
 
The Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS) system trans-
mits and settles U.S. dollar payments among participating banks.122 CHIPS 
was organized in 1970 with eight members and gradually expanded thereaf-
ter.123 CHIPS is operated by The Clearing House Payments Company L.L.C., 
which is based in New York.124 CHIPS processed an average of approxi-
mately 361,000 payments per day during 2010, and the total value of transfers 
originated during that year was about $365 trillion.125 Unlike the real-time 
gross settlement system of Fedwire, CHIPS allows for payments to be netted, 
allowing for the consolidation of pending payments into a fewer number of 
transactions.126 CHIPS transfers daily amount to approximately 80% of non-
securities transfers by Fedwire.127 “CHIPS clears and settles approximately 
$1.5 trillion in domestic and international payments per day.”128 The CHIPS 
system is governed by the law of the state of New York and operates in the 
following manner: 
A CHIPS participant sends a payment message to CHIPS in a 
structured format . . . . The payment message is sent to CHIPS 
through one of two communications-networks . . . . Upon re-
ceipt of a payment message, CHIPS will perform systems syn-
tax checks rejecting any payment message that does not pass 
the checks. Once these syntax checks have been completed, 
CHIPS will move the payment message to a queue where a 
computer algorithm determines whether to release the mes-
sage. The payment message will be released if the algorithm 
 
 122 BANK OF INT’L SETTLEMENTS, PAYMENT, CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 471, 488 (2013), https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d105_us.pdf. 
 123 CHIPS, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. (Apr. 2002), https://www.newyorkfed.org/about 
thefed/fedpoint/fed36.html. 
 124 CLEARING HOUSE, CLEARING HOUSE INTERBANK PAYMENTS SYSTEM (“CHIPS”) 
PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF LEGAL, GOVERNANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND OPERATING 
FRAMEWORK  1, 6 (2018), https://www.theclearinghouse.org/-/media/new/tch/documents/p 
ayment-systems/chips-public-disclosure-2018.pdf. 
 125 BANK OF INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 122, at 3.2.2.3. 
   126 About CHIPS, CLEARING HOUSE, https://www.theclearinghouse.org/~/link.aspx? 
_id=8AD2931B0ED0468DB096332DA183241B&_z=z (last visited Nov. 12, 2019). 
 127 CHIPS, supra note 123. 
   128 About CHIPS, supra note 126; see also Phillip Silitschanu, B2B Payments Lending: 
What Are Fedwire Transfers?, https://www.americanexpress.com/us/foreign-exchange/ar 
ticles/fedwire-transfers/#:~:targetText=The%20Fedwire%20transfer%20system%20is,tw 
elve%20U.S.%20Federal%20Reserve%20Banks.&targetText=Because%20Fed-wire%tra 
nsfers%20do%20not,Bank%20actually%20transfers%20US%245%2C000 (last visited 
Nov. 22, 2019). 
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determines that it can be released and settled within the param-
eters sent by the CHIPS Rules. 129 
Each CHIPS participant must deposit a predetermined amount into a pre-
funded balance account and may also transfer additional funds into the ac-
count.130 
Relevant to this Article’s examination of the role of U.S. persons in dollar 
clearing, CHIPS participants “must be a U.S. depository institution or a U.S. 
branch or agency of a foreign bank, and if a participant uses a leased telecom-
munications line as its connection to CHIPS, the line must terminate at an 
office of the participant located in the United States.”131 Therefore, “for each 
CHIPS payment message, both the sender and the receiving bank is a U.S. 
bank.”132 
 
iii. Offshore Clearing Systems 
 
U.S. dollar accounts may also be cleared through offshore dollar clearing 
transactions, including through systems based in Singapore, Hong Kong, the 
Philippines, and Japan.133 Within Singapore, the U.S. Dollar Cheque Clearing 
system “clear[s] and settle[s] U.S. dollar-denominated cheques drawn on 
banks in Singapore.”134 CHATS allows for real-time gross settlement of U.S. 
dollar payments and payments vs. payment of U.S. vs. Hong Kong dollars.135 
For the Singaporean USDCCS, “BCS and Citibank are the appointed clear-
ing operator and settlement bank, respectively . . . .” BSC is the Banking 
Computer Services Pte Ltd.136 The USDCCS operates as follows: 
(1) USD cheques are delivered to the [Singapore Automated 
Clearing House] ACH by presenting banks. (2) At the end of 
 
 129 THE CLEARING HOUSE, CLEARING HOUSE INTERBANK PAYMENTS SYSTEM (“CHIPS”) 
SELF-ASSESSMENT OF COMPLIANCE WITH STANDARDS FOR SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT 
PAYMENT SYSTEMS 6 (2016), https://www.theclearinghouse.org/-/media/files/payco%20fil 
es/standards%20self%20assessment%202016.pdf?la=en. 
   130 Id. 
 131 Id. at 12. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Clif Burns, Touch a U.S. Dollar Anywhere, Go Directly to U.S. Jail, EXPORT L. BLOG 
(Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.exportlawblog.com/archives/8621; see also Kerr, supra note 
111 (“Tokyo, Hong Kong, Singapore and Manila are the only official offshore US dollar 
clearing centres”). 
 134 Payment Systems in Singapore, BANK OF INT’L SETTLEMENTS 1, 10 (2003), https://ww 
 w.bis.org/cpmi/paysys/singaporecomp.pdf. 
 135 Bech, supra note 107. 
 136 Payment Systems in Singapore, supra note 134, at 3, 10. 
2019] CAUSING A SANCTIONS VIOLATION WITH U.S. DOLLARS 61 
the first day, the ACH will generate a settlement statement to 
the settlement bank setting out the total credits and the total 
debits of each of the participating banks. (3) The settlement 
bank then advises participating banks if there will be insuffi-
cient funds in their accounts with the settlement bank, based 
on a comparison of the total debit position against available 
funds in each participating bank’s account. Participating banks 
are required to meet any projected shortfall. (4) The ACH pro-
cesses and sorts the USD cheques and these are available for 
collection by the relevant paying banks on the second business 
day. Settlement occurs on the second business day across par-
ticipating banks’ accounts with Citibank, but the funds are not 
considered “cleared funds” until the end of day three. (5) All 
returned unpaid USD cheques are delivered to the ACH at the 
latest by the morning of the third business day. (6) The ACH 
processes the returned cheques and the relevant presenting 
banks collect them by noon on the third business day. (7) The 
customers can then withdraw the proceeds after 14:00 on the 
third business day. 137 
Hong Kong’s USD CHATS began operating on August 21, 2000.138 The 
settlement institution of the USD CHATS is The Hongkong and Shanghai 
Banking Corporation139, which is a wholly owned subsidiary of HSBC and is 
headquartered in Hong Kong.140 HSBC itself is headquartered in the United 
Kingdom.141 Settlement in the USD CHATS system takes place on the books 
of HSBC in New York City.142 The settlement institution has appointed as 
system operator Hong Kong Interbank Clearing Limited (HKICL), which is 
jointly owned by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and the Hong Kong 
Association of Banks (HKAB), which is the association of the licensed banks 
 
 137 Id. at 10-11. 
 138 H.K. MONETARY AUTH., ASSESSMENT OF US DOLLAR CHATS AGAINST THE 
PRINCIPLES FOR FINANCIAL MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES 1, 4 (2016), https://www.hkma.gov 
.hk/media/eng/doc/key-functions/banking-stability/oversight/US_Dollar_CHATS_2016.p 
df. 
 139 BANK OF INT’L SETTLEMENTS, PAYMENT, CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS IN 
HONG KONG SAR 1, 10 (2012), https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d105_hk.pdf. 
   140 HSBC, HSBC BANK (CHINA) COMPANY LIMITED FACT SHEET (2009), https://www.hs 
bc.com.cn/1/PA_ES_Content_Mgmt/content/china/about/docs/factsheetenJan09.pdf. 
   141 Id. 
 142 Morten L. Bech et al., Global Trends in Large-Value Payments, FRBNY ECON. POL’Y 
REV. 59, 66 (Sept. 2008), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/epr/0 
8v14n2/0809prei.pdf. “Direct participants can enjoy an interest-free overdraft facility and 
interest-free intraday repos if they can repay HSBC’s New York correspondent before the 
close of the New York CHIPS on that value day.” BANK OF INT’L SETTLEMENTS, PAYMENT 
SYSTEMS IN HONG KONG 1, 197 (2003), https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d53p07 hk.pdf. 
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in Hong Kong.143 “Participants must connect to the SWIFT network in order 
to access USD CHATS to initiate or receive payment instructions.”144 USD 
CHATS is governed by the laws of Hong Kong.145 In 2015, USD CHATS 
settled transactions daily averaging $25 billion. 146 
As part of the USD CHATS validation process, “[a]ll validated transac-
tions will be sent to a sanction screening system for scanning” before settle-
ment occurs.147 A 2016 update from Hong Kong Interbank Clearing Limited 
states that “USD CHATS has been enhanced to interface with the HSBC Sanc-
tion screening system, replacing the Centralised Payment Filter, with effect 
from 1 August 2016 to provide corresponding payment sanction screening ca-
pabilities.”148 
The Philippine Domestic Dollar Transfer System (PDDTS) is used for the 
transfer of U.S. dollars across banks in the Philippines.149 Citi Philippines is 
the settlement bank for PDDTS, which position it has held since 1994.150 Citi 
Philippines is a branch of Citibank, and thus would be considered a U.S. per-
son under the sanctions regulations.151 Within Japan, JP Morgan Chase & Co. 
(a U.S. entity) has operated Japan’s Tokyo Dollar Clearing system since its 
establishment in 1986.152 
 
 
 
 
 
 143 H.K. MONETARY AUTH., supra note 138, at 4-5. 
 144 Id. at 6. 
 145 Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures: Disclosure for USD CHATS, HSBC 
GRP. MGMT. SERV. LTD., https://www.hsbcnet.com/-/media/hsbcnet/attachments/products- 
services/transaction-banking/payments-cash-management/principles-for-financial-market 
-infrastructures.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2019). 
 146 See H.K. MONETARY AUTH., supra note 138, at 3.11. 
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B. Does Using U.S. Dollars Necessarily “Cause a Violation” of the 
Sanctions Regulations Through Dollar Clearing? 
 
Apart from the issue of differences in language and the extraterritorial ap-
plication of the statute, there is the question of whether, where there is broad 
regulatory causation language in place, the use of U.S. dollars in transactions 
by foreign parties with U.S.-sanctioned parties would necessarily cause a 
sanctions violation. Additionally, there is a question of what conduct OFAC 
could regulate based on the theory of direct or indirect export of financial ser-
vices to a sanctioned party. The answer to this question will have implications 
for general compliance: should parties, U.S. and non-U.S., consider there to 
be a blanket restriction on the use of U.S. dollars in such transactions? The 
answer will also affect OFAC enforcement actions: will OFAC necessarily 
need to show a U.S. nexus in each enforcement action? Or will the presence 
of U.S. dollars be sufficient to assume the causation of a sanctions violation? 
This analysis therefore involves identifying the involvement of parties subject 
to the U.S. sanctions regulations when U.S. dollars are used in a transaction, 
and how their involvement in a U.S. dollar-denominated transaction might 
violate OFAC regulations. 
 
i. U.S. Dollar Clearing Systems 
 
As described above, the CHIPS and Fedwire systems will necessarily in-
volve a U.S. party at some point in a dollar clearing transaction. During the 
course of a payment completed using the Fedwire system, the Federal Reserve 
Bank involved completes the necessary debit and credit of the relevant Fed-
wire participant. The CHIPS system itself, owned and operated by a U.S. com-
pany, would also be a “U.S. person” under the OFAC regulations. Moreover, 
within the CHIPS system, both the sender and the receiving bank are U.S 
banks, which necessarily involves a U.S. person in the course of a CHIPS 
transaction. 
Therefore, the use of the CHIPS or Fedwire systems could be considered 
to cause a sanctions violation if a U.S. dollar-denominated transaction was 
processed involving a U.S.-sanctioned party, due to the necessary involve-
ment of U.S. entities in the dollar clearing process. The extremely large vol-
ume of transactions processed by the CHIPS and Fedwire systems together 
will therefore give great effect and wide reach to the broad causation provi-
sions when applied to U.S. dollar-denominated transactions. 
 
ii. Offshore Dollar Clearing Systems 
 
U.S. dollar-denominated transactions made between foreign parties and 
effected through offshore clearing centers have, on their face, a less clear 
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jurisdictional nexus to the OFAC regulations than do the U.S. dollar-denomi-
nated transactions transacted through U.S. payment systems. However, as de-
scribed above, since the settlement banks used in offshore dollar clearing sys-
tems, such as in the Singaporean dollar clearing system or the Hong Kong 
USD CHATS system, are U.S. entities, it seems that the involvement of a U.S. 
settlement bank could be considered a U.S. party necessarily involved in a 
transaction where dollar clearing and settlement occurs. Thus, a U.S. dollar-
denominated transaction involving a U.S. settlement bank would be consid-
ered to cause the U.S. settlement bank to violate the sanctions regulations and 
thus form the basis for liability under a broad causation provision. Indeed, it 
seems that such might have been the jurisdictional nexus for OFAC to bring 
the TransTel action, as that matter involved a non-U.S. party acting outside of 
the U.S. with dollar transactions effected in Singapore.153 
Based on this logic, it appears that the involvement of a U.S. settlement 
bank would form a sufficient basis for the application of U.S. dollar sanctions 
in the context of transactions effected by means of offshore dollar clearing 
systems when the broad causation provisions or a theory of export of financial 
services are used. By the plain language of the regulations, OFAC in most 
cases would be authorized to take action against parties using U.S. dollars in 
transactions with sanctioned entities.154 This is, however, separate from the 
question of whether the sanctions programs were intended to wield such wide-
 
 153 It has been argued that the presence of a settlement bank is not in itself sufficient to 
constitute the export of a financial service from the United States in the context of an off-
shore dollar clearing system. 
  Say a bank in Singapore pays $10,000 for a customer’s Iran transaction but during the 
day pays out $200,000 and receives $100,000 where none of these other dollar transactions 
have anything to do with Iran. It will need to transfer $100,000 to the Singapore clearing 
house, which will be effectuated through a U.S. Dollar correspondent account in the United 
States. In that case the bank in the United States has not transferred any financial services 
to Iran because the payment relates to an aggregate of transactions valued at $300,000, 
almost all of which have nothing to do with Iran. The only scenario in the Singapore clear-
ing situation where the U.S. bank would transfer a financial service to Iran would be where 
the Iran payment by the Singapore bank is the only U.S. dollar transaction by the Singapore 
bank during the clearing day. Burns, supra note 133. 
  However, based on the existence of the TransTel settlement, it seems that OFAC con-
siders the general presence of a U.S. settlement bank in a dollar clearing system to be suf-
ficient to support U.S. jurisdiction. The broad language of the OFAC prohibitions in gen-
eral might form the basis for a potential argument by OFAC that the nature of causing a 
violation would depend not on the direct transfer of financial services to a sanctioned party 
or country by virtue of a direct dollar transfer in connection with a particular transaction, 
but perhaps indirectly where the sanctioned party is able to take advantage of a U.S. dollar 
payment system that would not be able to function without the general involvement of the 
U.S. financial institution as the settlement bank. 
 154 See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 542.201 (Syrian sanctions regulation prohibiting dealings in 
property and interests in property in the possession or control of U.S. persons of blocked 
parties and the Government of Syria). 
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ranging authority, or whether the extraterritorial reach of these sanctions 
should be limited by other principles. 
Consistent with the conclusion that the use of the U.S. dollar is enough to 
involve the actions of U.S. entities, even where those dollars are not held at 
U.S. financial institutions, the case of U.S. v. Zarrab upheld the authority of 
OFAC to reach transactions based on the use of U.S. dollars alone (though 
that case examined a theory of liability based on an export of financial ser-
vices, rather than based on a broad causation provision).155 In Zarrab, the de-
fendant was charged in part with conspiracy to violate the IEEPA and the 
ITSR, among other counts, by allegedly “conducting international financial 
transactions using Turkish and Emirati companies on behalf of and for the 
benefit of Iranian individuals and entities in order to conceal from U.S. banks 
and others that services were being provided” to sanctioned parties and to 
Iran.156 In his motion to dismiss the indictment, the defendant argued that 31 
C.F.R. § 560.204, which prohibits exports, directly or indirectly, from the 
United States or by a U.S. person, did not apply to his conduct because “[t]he 
funds [the defendant] and his alleged co-conspirators sent to third countries, 
purportedly for the benefit of Iran, all came ‘from’ accounts held outside of 
the U.S. by foreign persons at foreign banks.”157 He argued that a U.S. nexus 
had not been created by “the mere fact that a U.S. bank cleared a payment 
originating and terminating at foreign banks . . . .”158 The court, however, dis-
agreed with the defendant’s interpretation of the ITSR. It noted that the Sec-
ond Circuit “has made clear that ‘the execution of money transfers on behalf 
of others from the United States to Iran’ may constitute the exportation or 
supply of a prohibited ‘service,’ in violation of the IEEPA and the ITSR.”159 
The court found that the indictment alleged a U.S. nexus: namely, the expor-
tation of services from the U.S. in the form of financial services.160 
Based on the previous analysis of the offshore dollar clearing systems, the 
use of the U.S. dollar is enough to trigger a U.S. nexus sufficient to support 
the application of U.S. sanctions regulations, whether the transaction is ef-
fected through a U.S. or offshore dollar clearing system. Consistently, the 
Zarrab case found that the use of U.S. dollars constituted the rendering of a 
financial service, even when those dollars were held abroad.161 Based on these 
facts and on the OFAC enforcement history detailed earlier in this Article, 
OFAC will likely seek to continue to apply U.S. sanctions provisions to 
 
 155 Zarrab, 2016 WL 6820737, at *11. 
 156 Id. at *7 n.11. 
 157 Id. at *5 (citing Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Reza Zarrab’s Motion 
to Dismiss, United States v. Zarrab, No. S1 15 Cr. 867 (RMB), 2016 WL 10998479, at *11 
(S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2016) [hereinafter Zarrab Motion to Dismiss]). 
 158 Id. at *5 (citing Zarrab Motion to Dismiss, 2016 WL 10998479, at *12). 
 159 Id. at *7 (quoting United States v. Banki, 685 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2012)). 
 160 Id. at *8. 
   161 Id. at *35. 
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transactions involving the U.S. dollar and undertaken with U.S.-sanctioned 
parties, whether by employing the broad causation provisions or a theory of 
liability based on the export of financial services from the United States. 
V.  CURRENT ISSUES RELATED TO DIFFERING CAUSATION PROVISIONS 
This Part will discuss some of the issues that arise in the context of certain 
sanctions programs with different causation language. It will also examine the 
general manner in which OFAC makes known and clarifies the sanctions com-
pliance obligations connected with the use of the U.S. dollar arising as a result 
of the broad causation provisions and the general prohibitions on the export 
of services. This Article recommends that the prohibitions around the use of 
the U.S. dollar, especially by foreign parties and through offshore dollar clear-
ing systems, be highlighted more clearly and consistently within OFAC pub-
lications, web notices, and responses to frequently asked questions, in order 
to ensure that the requirements around the use of the U.S. dollar are more 
broadly and accurately understood and to promote compliance with those re-
quirements. 
 
A. Notice 
 
i. OFAC Publications 
 
Whether a blanket prohibition applied to block U.S. dollar transactions 
with a sanctioned party (even when such a transaction is carried out by a non-
U.S. person) is not always readily apparent upon either a reading of the plain 
text of the sanctions laws and regulations or a review of informational material 
put forth by OFAC. More recently, however, OFAC has provided additional 
guidance regarding the obligations of non-U.S. parties under the OFAC regu-
lations with respect to their use of U.S. dollars,162 which suggests that the use 
of U.S. dollars can often trigger a sanctions violation, even for non-U.S. enti-
ties conducting transactions outside of the United States. Even so, OFAC has 
not yet publicly addressed the issue of whether differing causation language 
across U.S. sanctions programs might affect any prohibitions against U.S. dol-
lar use with sanctioned parties, or whether any such dealings would be con-
sidered an indirect export of financial services and thus the differing causation 
language would have no practical effect on the obligations of foreign parties 
with respect to U.S. dollars. 
In May 2019, OFAC issued a Framework for OFAC Compliance Commit-
ments providing information on how entities could use a risk-based approach 
 
 162 See discussion infra p. 67-68. 
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to sanctions compliance, based on at least management commitment, risk as-
sessment, internal controls, testing and auditing, and training.163 Within that 
document, OFAC provided a list of root causes of OFAC sanctions compli-
ance program breakdowns or deficiencies, based on its assessment of prior 
OFAC administrative actions.164 One such deficiency listed was “Utilizing the 
U.S. Financial System, or Processing Payments to or through U.S. Financial 
Institutions, for Commercial Transactions Involving OFAC-Sanctioned Per-
sons or Countries.”165 That root cause was explained by OFAC as follows: 
Many non-U.S. persons have engaged in violations of OFAC’s 
regulations by processing financial transactions (almost all of 
which have been denominated in U.S. Dollars) to or through 
U.S. financial institutions that pertain to commercial activity 
involving an OFAC-sanctioned country, region, or person. 
Although no organizations subject to U.S. jurisdiction may be 
involved in the underlying transaction–such as the shipment of 
goods from a third-country to an OFAC-sanctioned country–
the inclusion of a U.S. financial institution in any payments 
associated with these transactions often results in a prohibited 
activity (e.g., the exportation or re-exportation of services 
from the United States to a comprehensively sanctioned coun-
try, or dealing in blocked property in the United States).166 
The Compliance Framework therefore explained that the use of U.S. dol-
lars may “often” result in a prohibited activity such as the export of services 
to a sanctioned country, but the Framework did not reach the issue of whether 
a blanket prohibition is in place against the use of U.S. dollars in transactions 
with sanctioned entities, both for U.S. and foreign parties. This language is 
helpful for alerting entities to review their use of U.S. dollars in regard to U.S. 
sanctions compliance, including the examples of comprehensively sanctioned 
countries or dealing in blocked property, but does not entirely clarify when 
the use of U.S. dollars does or does not implicate the U.S. sanctions regula-
tions.   
Before the Framework was issued, other OFAC documents referenced the 
nexus between U.S. dollars and U.S. sanctions more obliquely. For example, 
on January 16, 2016, OFAC issued responses to FAQs relating to the lifting 
 
 163 OFAC Issues a Framework for Compliance Commitments, U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY (May 2, 2019), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm680; A 
Framework for OFAC Compliance Commitments, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://w 
ww.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/framework_ofac_cc.pdf (last vis-
ited Nov. 12, 2019). 
 164 See Framework for OFAC Compliance Commitments, supra note 163. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. 
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of certain U.S. sanctions under the JCPOA on Implementation Day.167 The 
response to question C. 7. indicated that foreign financial institutions, “includ-
ing foreign-incorporated subsidiaries of U.S. financial institutions,” could 
process U.S. dollar-denominated transactions or maintain U.S. dollar-denom-
inated accounts involving Iran or persons ordinarily resident in Iran, or of per-
sons blocked solely pursuant to E.O. 13599 and section 560.211 of the ITSR, 
so long as such transactions did not involve any SDN and if such activities 
“d[id] not involve, directly or indirectly, the United States financial system or 
any United States person.”168 The response further noted that foreign financial 
institutions needed to ensure that such transactions were not processed 
through the U.S. financial system or otherwise involved U.S. financial insti-
tutions (including foreign branches), in order to comply with the continued 
prohibition on U.S. persons exporting financial services directly or indirectly 
to Iran (including in currencies other than the U.S. dollar).169 Similarly, the 
response to question C. 8. indicated that non-U.S. persons were now permitted 
to provide U.S. bank notes to the Government of Iran, so long as the activity 
did not involve an SDN or prohibited conduct.170 Such transactions were pro-
hibited from transiting the U.S. financial system.171 This language, by refer-
encing currencies other than the U.S. dollar, and the need to avoid the U.S. 
financial system, hinted that the U.S. dollar cannot be used in any transaction 
prohibited by the Iranian sanctions regulation, but that prohibition was not 
stated outright. 
Beyond the Compliance Framework, the OFAC FAQs in place on the 
OFAC website also do not directly address the issue when the use of the U.S. 
dollar may involve the application of U.S. sanctions. Currently, OFAC FAQ 
11 responds to the question: “Who must comply with OFAC regulations?” 
U.S. persons must comply with OFAC regulations, including all U.S. citi-
zens and permanent resident aliens regardless of where they are located, all 
persons and entities within the United States, all U.S. incorporated entities and 
their foreign branches. In the case of certain programs, foreign subsidiaries 
owned or controlled by U.S. companies must comply. Certain programs also 
require foreign persons in possession of U.S.-origin goods to comply. 172 
 
 167 JCPOA Implementation, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (Jan. 16, 2016), https://www.tr 
easury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFACEnforcement/Pages/jcpoa_implementation.as 
px. 
 168 Frequently Asked Questions Relating to the Lifting of Certain U.S. Sanctions Under 
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Implementation Day, U.S. DEP’T OF 
THE TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents 
/jcpoa_faqs.pdf (last updated Dec. 15, 2016). 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. 
 172 OFAC FAQs: General Questions, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://www.treasury 
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While the response mentions the responsibilities of non-U.S. persons in 
possession of U.S. goods to comply, there is nothing in the FAQ response to 
indicate a similar responsibility of a foreign person in possession of U.S. dol-
lars. This FAQ could be amended to indicate the presence of obligations with 
respect to U.S. dollars. Likewise, it was unclear in previous FAQs relating to 
the ITSR whether all U.S. dollar transactions were prohibited.173 
Before the TransTel settlement and the issuance of the Compliance Frame-
work, it was unclear whether OFAC would consider the use of the U.S. dollar, 
even in offshore clearing systems, to be prohibited in connection with trans-
actions with sanctioned parties, based on the expansive causation provisions. 
For example, S.2752 proposed prohibiting the President from issuing any li-
cense under IEEPA that would permit anyone “to conduct an offshore United 
States dollar clearing system for transactions involving the Government of 
Iran or an Iranian person,” or “to provide United States dollars for any off-
shore United States dollar clearing system conducted or overseen by a foreign 
government or a foreign financial institution for transactions involving the 
Government of Iran or an Iranian person.” 174 This bill assumed that a license 
was necessary for these actions to be undertaken, which is consistent with the 
position taken by OFAC in the TransTel settlement (namely, that the use of 
U.S. dollars with a blocked party in Singapore, with its offshore dollar clear-
ing system, was prohibited). It was unclear, however, that such actions would 
in fact require a license; the role of the U.S. dollar in connection with U.S. 
sanctions was itself not entirely clear.175 
OFAC, then, has an opportunity to use its informational materials to pro-
vide general guidance on how the use of the U.S. dollar might trigger U.S. 
sanctions, such that U.S. and non-U.S. parties might have clearer expectations 
around their U.S. sanctions compliance obligations. 
 
ii. Notice Issues Concerning Definition of “U.S. Person” 
 
The limited causation provisions may seem to have the advantage of clarity 
in penalizing only actions taken within the U.S. or by a U.S. person that cause 
a violation of the U.S. sanctions. Certain notice issues, however, do also exist 
 
.gov/resource-center/faqs/sanctions/pages/faq_general.aspx (last visited Oct. 19, 2019). 
 173 Tyler Cullis, Unresolved Questions on Offshore Dollar-Clearing, SANCTIONLAW 
BLOG (Apr. 15, 2016), https://sanctionlaw.com/unresolved-questions-on-offshore-dollar-c 
learing/. 
 174 Preventing Iran’s Access to United States Dollars Act of 2016, S. 2752, 114th Cong. 
(2016). 
 175 See, e.g., Tyler Cullis, Memo: Senators Kirk and Rubio Bill on Dollar Clearing Would 
Violate Iran Deal, NIAC ACTION (Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.niacaction.org/memo-senat 
ors-kirk-and-rubio-bill-on-dollar-clearing-would-violate-iran-deal/ (stating that “foreign 
banks are likely not barred from clearing U.S. dollar-denominated transactions involving 
Iran if such dollar clearing does not touch the United States.”). 
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in the context of the limited causation provision. Namely, parties seeking to 
comply with the limited causation provision must contend with the issue of 
how well-defined a “U.S. person” is or what actions “within the U.S.” consti-
tute in connection with the limited causation language. 
For example, the issue of the definition of a “U.S. person” under the mean-
ing of the sanctions regulations arose in 2017, when OFAC issued a finding 
of violation to B Whale Corporation (BWC).176 BWC was based in Taipei, 
Taiwan and had entered into a bankruptcy proceeding in a U.S. bankruptcy 
court. OFAC “determined that BWC was a U.S. person within the scope of 
the ITSR because it was present in the United States for the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings when the transaction occurred.”177 Moreover, the vessel was found 
to be subject to U.S. sanctions regulations “because it was property under the 
jurisdiction of a U.S. bankruptcy court.”178 
BWC itself filed the bankruptcy petition at issue, thereby voluntarily mak-
ing itself subject to the U.S. judicial system.179 What if BWC had appeared as 
a defendant or otherwise involuntarily in a U.S. court case? The BWC case, 
therefore, raises questions regarding the expansiveness of the definition of a 
“U.S. person” as defined by the U.S. sanctions regulations,180 and thus the 
effectiveness of limited causation principles in helping a foreign party to un-
derstand and comply with its U.S. sanctions obligations. Where the meaning 
of a “U.S. person” is interpreted broadly, parties located outside of the United 
States might not be aware or might have difficulty in determining whether 
they would be considered U.S. persons under the meaning of the OFAC reg-
ulations, especially where the theory of export of financial services is also in 
place. 
 
iii. The 50% Rule 
 
Restrictions on the use of the U.S. dollar by non-U.S. parties might be par-
ticularly difficult for the compliance efforts of those parties in light of the 
existence of OFAC’s 50% Rule, whereby parties may be subject to U.S. 
 
 176 OFAC Issues a Finding of Violation to B Whale Corporation, a Member of the TMT 
Group of Shipping Companies, for a Violation of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions 
Regulations, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanc 
tions/CivPen/Documents/20170203_bwc.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2019). 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Debtor’s Emergency Motion for an Order (I) Authorizing the Debtors to Use Cash 
Collateral of Existing Secured Lenders, (II) Granting Adequate Protection for Use Thereof, 
(III) Scheduling Final Hearing at 1, 3, In re TMT USA Shipmanagement LLC, No. 13-
33740 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. June 20, 2013). 
 180 Clif Burns, OFAC Radically Expands Its Extraterritorial Jurisdiction with B Whale 
Ruling, EXPORT LAW BLOG (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.exportlawblog.com/archives/8298. 
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sanctions even if they are not explicitly designated, by reason of their corpo-
rate ownership. Foreign entities seeking to use the U.S. dollar must therefore 
inquire into the corporate ownership of potential transaction parties, in addi-
tion to screening such parties to determine if they have been specifically 
named to U.S. government lists. 
OFAC originally issued its 50% Rule on February 14, 2008 and issued 
revised guidance on August 13, 2014 concerning this policy.181 As referenced 
earlier in this Article, pursuant to the 50% Rule, entities are blocked when 
they are owned in a 50% or greater interest by blocked persons, individually 
or in the aggregate, directly or indirectly.182 As such, “a U.S. person generally 
may not engage in any transactions with such an entity, unless authorized by 
OFAC.”183 Moreover, “[a] property interest subject to blocking includes in-
terest of any nature whatsoever, direct or indirect.”184 The revised guidance 
advised U.S. persons “to act with caution when considering a transaction with 
a non-blocked entity in which one or more persons has a significant ownership 
interest that is less than 50 percent or which one or more persons may control 
by means other than a majority ownership interest,”185 since such entities 
could be the subject of future OFAC designations or enforcement actions. 
The 50% Rule thereby raises certain issues for foreign entities seeking to 
ensure corporate compliance. Identifying those parties with whom U.S. dol-
lars cannot be used becomes more challenging when going beyond specifi-
cally named parties or governments and considering issues of corporate own-
ership, especially where such ownership information may not be publicly 
available. Non-U.S. parties have the obligation, then, to inquire into the own-
ership of parties to any U.S. dollar transaction. This was demonstrated by the 
OFAC settlement in connection with Barclays Zimbabwe in which, as de-
scribed above, Barclays settled for apparent violations involving corporate 
customers of Barclays Bank of Zimbabwe Limited that were owned 50 per-
cent or more by an entity on OFAC’s SDN List and which held U.S. dollar-
denominated accounts.186 
Further, as a settlement between OFAC and Cobham Holdings, Inc. 
demonstrates, effective screening of transaction parties may be impeded due 
to screening software failures, making it more difficult for companies to 
 
 181 OFAC FAQs: Sanctions Compliance, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://www.trea 
sury.gov/resource-center/faqs/sanctions/pages/faq_compliance.aspx (last visited Oct. 19, 
2019). 
 182 Revised Guidance on Entities Owned by Persons Whose Property and Interests in 
Property Are Blocked, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (Aug. 13, 2014), https://www.treasury 
.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/licensing_guidance.pdf. 
 183 Id. Additionally, for the Cuban sanctions program (and the former Sudanese sanctions 
program), other criteria of ownership or control can result in an entity being blocked. Id. 
 184 Id. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Megaw, supra note 81. 
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effectively ascertain their compliance responsibilities and identify potentially 
problematic transaction partners when using U.S. dollars.187 In the Cobham 
settlement, Metelics (a subsidiary of Cobham at the time) apparently violated 
the Ukraine Related Sanctions Regulations by selling items to a blocked per-
son through distributors in Canada and Russia.188 The purchaser, although not 
specifically identified on OFAC’s List of Specially Designated Nationals and 
Blocked Persons (the SDN List), was 51% owned by an SDN, and as such 
was blocked by way of the 50% Rule.189 Metelics performed denied party 
screenings, but the third-party screening software used did not produce any 
warnings or alerts for the purchaser.190 This was due to a failure of the soft-
ware to identify matches to the SDN List containing additional words in the 
inputted language.191 As this case demonstrates, parties can be the subject of 
OFAC enforcement actions even where they have taken steps to screen their 
transaction parties and attempted to comply with OFAC regulations, and com-
pliance can be complicated by the existence of OFAC’s 50% Rule. 
 
iv. Notice and Effect on Compliance Efforts 
 
Non-U.S. individuals and entities do not face a clearly-defined set of rules 
when trying to determine what activities they may perform with U.S. dollars; 
even though an effective prohibition against the use of U.S. dollars in trans-
actions with sanctioned entities may be in place, that prohibition is not readily 
apparent from a textual reading of the U.S. sanctions regulations. The use of 
the causation provisions as a basis for liability further muddies these expecta-
tions, as the causation provisions appear in two different forms across sanc-
tions programs. These requirements around the use of U.S. dollars are not 
well-publicized by OFAC, and the vague language of “causing a violation” 
can easily fail to convey the basic directive that U.S. dollars cannot be used in 
transactions with sanctioned entities and may also obscure the fact that there 
could be an alternative basis for liability based on the export of financial ser-
vices from the United States. This vagueness is especially worrisome where 
violation of these laws may involve criminal as well as civil penalties, as pre-
viously discussed. 
Compliance is especially difficult where any transaction, no matter how 
small, may trigger a sanctions violation, since OFAC does not have a 
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minimum value threshold on transactions that constitute a sanctions viola-
tion.192 Companies may lack visibility as to which companies are considered 
sanctioned entities in light of OFAC’s 50% Rule and in the absence of public 
ownership information. The broad causation principles and the TransTel en-
forcement stance create the requirement that non-U.S. parties screen all par-
ties to a transaction involving U.S. dollars. 
OFAC has provided some guidance on its enforcement stance with respect 
to violations arising as a result of utilizing the U.S. financial system. While 
the information provides some reassurance that OFAC mainly focuses its 
compliance efforts on willful, reckless, or fraudulent behavior in connection 
with the use of the U.S. financial system, that information does not insulate 
non-U.S. business entities from potential enforcement actions should they 
cause violations of the sanctions programs without the presence of such ac-
tions. Namely, OFAC stated the following within its listing of Root Causes of 
compliance program deficiencies and breakdowns: 
OFAC has generally focused its enforcement investigations on 
persons who have engaged in willful or reckless conduct, at-
tempted to conceal their activity (e.g., by stripping or manipu-
lating payment messages, or making false representations to 
their non-U.S. or U.S. financial institution), engaged in a pat-
tern or practice of conduct for several months or years, ignored 
or failed to consider numerous warning signs that the conduct 
was prohibited, involved actual knowledge or involvement by 
the organization’s management, caused significant harm to 
U.S. sanctions program objectives, and were large or sophisti-
cated organizations. 193 
These enforcement factors, however, offer little in the way of bright-line 
rules to help entities understand the prohibitions in place against the use of 
U.S. dollars with respect to the U.S. sanctions regulations and thereby imple-
ment an effective sanctions compliance program. These factors largely pre-
suppose knowledge of the prohibitions involving U.S. dollars in their contem-
plation of parties who act willfully or recklessly and do not address the issue 
of entities who might not fully understand the scope of their compliance obli-
gations with respect to U.S. dollars. 
A lack of clear and public information around how U.S. sanctions regula-
tions apply to U.S. dollar-denominated transactions might also cause a 
chilling effect on transactions that are legal but involve the use of U.S. dollars 
in areas where a relatively larger number of sanctioned parties reside. For 
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example, U.S. and European banks have scaled back relationships with banks 
in the Persian Gulf region due to sanctions concerns. 194 This trend would 
likely be exacerbated if OFAC brings other enforcement actions in the same 
vein as TransTel, namely, against non-U.S. entities who are not financial in-
stitutions, where the only nexus is the use of U.S. dollars, and where those 
enforcement actions are based on an expansive causation provision. If OFAC 
does not widely disseminate further information about the nature of U.S. sanc-
tions as applied to U.S. dollar-denominated transactions, this confusion will 
likely persist. 
 
v. Criminal Charges Based on Causation and Export of Financial 
Services 
 
Defining what types of conduct might be prohibited by the causation pro-
visions (along with the export of services to sanctioned parties) and consider-
ing the sufficiency of OFAC’s notice regarding the prohibition of such con-
duct are particularly important in light of the fact that criminal penalties are 
available for certain violations of the OFAC regulations. Paragraph (c) of 50 
U.S.C. § 1705 allows for a fine or imprisonment for any person who willfully 
commits, attempts to commit, conspires to commit, or aids and abets in the 
commission of, an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of the Penalties 
section.195 Paragraph (a) includes, among other unlawful acts, the causation 
of a violation of any license, order, regulation, or prohibition issued under 
IEEPA.196 Criminal penalties are possible for those who willfully commit acts 
that cause a sanctions violation.197 Such a possibility is problematic where the 
issue of what may cause a violation is expansively defined and the type of 
conduct prohibited is often unclear from the text of the regulatory language. 
Courts have found that various IEEPA prohibitions are not, in fact, unconsti-
tutionally vague.198 While a challenge to the causation provisions on vague-
ness grounds might be unsuccessful given such precedent, an argument none-
theless persists that OFAC should make as clear as possible any prohibitions 
in place that could involve criminal charges if violated. 
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While OFAC has recently done more to clarify the obligations of parties 
in connection with their use of the U.S. dollar, the reach and expansiveness of 
the causation provisions in contexts outside of the United States are far from 
clear. 
 
B. Considerations of Extraterritorial Application 
 
Beyond the issue of whether the express language of the causation regula-
tions permits the application of sanctions regulations to conduct outside the 
United States or by non-U.S. persons is the question of whether the regula-
tions and the IEEPA statute in general can be applied extraterritorially to reach 
such conduct. While this Article focuses primarily on the differences in the 
regulatory language itself, rather than on the greater issue of extraterritorial 
application, this question is relevant because it raises the issue of whether the 
expansive regulatory language would have been understood to reach only con-
duct by U.S. persons or within the United States due to a generally accepted 
principle that the statute not be extended extraterritorially. 
The case of U.S. v. Hoskins does not seem to limit the application of these 
causing provisions and IEEPA where the only U.S. nexus is the use of U.S. 
dollars, even though that case limited extraterritorial conduct prohibited by 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).199 In Hoskins, the Second Circuit 
considered the extraterritorial application of the FCPA to the conduct of a 
foreign national who “never set foot in the United States or worked for an 
American company during the alleged scheme,” on the theory that he was an 
accomplice or co-conspirator for an FCPA, for a crime that he was “incapable 
of committing as a principal.”200 With respect to the FCPA, the Second Circuit 
noted that “Congress had demonstrated an affirmative legislative policy in the 
FCPA to limit criminal liability to the enumerated categories of defend-
ants.”201 The court described the two-step framework for analyzing extrater-
ritoriality issues set forth by the Supreme Court in RJR Nabisco: first, whether 
the presumption against extraterritoriality has been rebutted, and if not, 
whether the case involves a domestic application of the statute, by examining 
the statute’s “focus.”202 
Despite the Second Circuit’s determination that Congress had expressly 
intended the FCPA to be applied only within the United States, no such ex-
press intent by Congress was demonstrated with respect to IEEPA, and the 
IEEPA statute is likely to be allowed to be applied extraterritorially. As dis-
cussed above, the court in Zarrab did not decide the defendant’s motion to 
dismiss the indictment on the grounds of extraterritorial application, since it 
 
 199 United States v. Hoskins, 902 F.3d 69, 92-93 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 200 Id. at 76. 
 201 Id. at 95. 
 202 Id. 
76 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. [Vol. 48:29 
 
found that the indictment had alleged a U.S. nexus.203 However, the court 
noted that “[a]ssuming, arguendo, that the issue of extraterritoriality were to 
be reached,” such arguments against the extraterritorial application of IEEPA 
and the ITSR “would likely prove to be unpersuasive.”204 Indeed, the court 
found that “[s]everal provisions of the IEEPA and the ITSR would (expressly) 
support the Court’s jurisdiction and any presumption against extraterritoriality 
would be overcome by the United States’ interest in defending itself.”205 
Moreover, the issue of whether the IEEPA statute can be applied extrater-
ritorially is unlikely to become an issue in the dollar-clearing context, because 
“[t]he presumption against extraterritoriality does not apply where the failure 
to extend the scope of the statute to a foreign setting will result in adverse 
effects within the United States or where the conduct regulated by the govern-
ment occurs within the United States.”206 Consistent with OFAC’s position in 
the TransTel settlement, dollar clearing will be assumed to involve actions 
and parties within the U.S. As discussed above, even offshore dollar clearing 
systems appear to trigger at least some tangential connection to actions taken 
by U.S. entities or within the United States. 
 
C. Potential Effects on the Use of the U.S. Dollar 
 
OFAC’s use of the broad causation provisions as an enforcement tool, 
along with the theory of export of financial services, means that sanctions 
policy will effectively follow the U.S. dollar outside of U.S. borders. Thus, 
U.S. sanctions policy can have a broad reach and affect a huge volume of 
international transactions. “The strength of American sanctions, after all, 
comes from the centrality of the United States financial system in the global 
economy, and the dollar’s status as the world’s dominant reserve currency.”207 
U.S. dollars are widely held abroad; U.S. dollar liabilities of non-U.S. 
banks totaled $12.8 trillion at the end of June 2018.208 As of the first quarter 
of 2019, the dollar constituted almost 62% of all known central bank foreign 
exchange reserves.209 Nations using the U.S. dollar as their official currency 
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include Panama, Ecuador, El Salvador, East Timor, and Zimbabwe.210 The 
U.S. dollar is the most dominant vehicle currency211, as it was on one side of 
88% of all trades in April 2016.212 
OFAC’s far-reaching enforcement stance with respect to U.S. dollar-de-
nominated transactions, however, might possibly discourage foreign parties 
from using the U.S. dollar to avoid the application of U.S. sanctions. Indeed, 
it has been suggested that “[e]xceedingly punitive penalties may foster the 
development of payment systems that avoid the US dollar or the United 
States.”213 Moreover, foreign banks may become more reluctant to become 
involved in transactions touching the U.S. dollar due to the sanctions implica-
tions of such activity. For example, the European Union has created the 
INSTEX payment system for use in trade with Iran, avoiding cash payments 
by banks by way of a virtual ledger, in order to avoid the application of U.S. 
sanctions with respect to Iran.214 The extended reach of U.S. sanctions could 
be a factor in making the U.S. dollar less attractive as a currency in which to 
complete international business transactions. 
The application of U.S. sanctions might be one factor, but not a determi-
native factor, in causing non-U.S. entities to choose to make their global busi-
ness transactions in a currency other than the U.S dollar. Indeed, “[b]ecause 
of increasingly tightening regulatory requirements (AML [anti-money laun-
dering] and CTF [combatting terrorism financing] as well as regulatory sanc-
tions requirements . . .) by key jurisdictions, such as the US and Europe, sev-
enty-five per cent of global bank providers in this space have reduced their 
correspondent banking relationships . . . or withdrawn from this business al-
together.”215 The issue of regulatory burden as a whole, rather than the partic-
ular application of U.S. sanctions, might diminish the use of U.S. dollars glob-
ally. The breadth and depth of the U.S. sanctions regulations, however, does 
certainly pose a unique burden to compliance at the present time. “The use of 
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sanctions has exploded in the 21st century”; as of May 2019, the United States 
had “7,967 sanctions in place.”216 OFAC’s application of U.S. sanctions reg-
ulations to certain transactions made outside of the United States and by non-
U.S. parties through the broad causation provisions and the export of financial 
services prohibitions therefore necessarily entails the application of a large 
number of regulatory rules and prohibitions.   
Despite the potential regulatory burden posed by requiring foreign parties 
to comply with U.S. sanctions regulations in connection with all transactions 
involving U.S. dollars, it does not currently appear likely that another cur-
rency will soon become the global reserve currency. “[W]hile the euro ac-
counted for the second-largest share of global central bank reserves by mid-
2018, its share was only around one-third that of the dollar,” and likewise, 
“[t]he renminbi accounted for . . . 1.84 per cent of global central bank reserves 
in mid-2018.”217 Indeed, as the enforcement actions described above demon-
strate, OFAC’s reach to transactions and parties largely outside of the United 
States but involving the U.S. dollar is not new, and yet the U.S. dollar contin-
ues to be widely used abroad. Given the present advantages and universality 
of the U.S. dollar, OFAC can most likely effectively attach its sanctions policy 
to the U.S. dollar without risking the wholesale abandonment of the U.S. dol-
lar by foreign entities in order to avoid U.S. sanctions. 
 
D. Cash 
 
A related issue is whether it would be possible for the broad causation 
provisions (or alternatively, the prohibition against the export of financial ser-
vices to sanctioned entities) to be interpreted to prohibit the use of U.S. dollars 
in the form of cash in transactions with sanctioned entities. If the sanctions 
obligations associated with U.S. dollars also applied to the use of the U.S. 
dollar in cash, such an enforcement policy would further extend the reach of 
U.S. sanctions to a large amount of funds. Namely, it was estimated as of year-
end 2010 that the value of U.S. notes and coins in circulation was $983 billion 
($942 billion in notes), of which as much as two-third was estimated to be 
held abroad.218 Around 2007, it was estimated that close to $500 billion, or 
nearly 60% of all U.S. banknotes in circulation, were held outside of the 
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United States.219 Currently, around $580 billion in U.S. currency is estimated 
to be used outside of the United States.220 
The OFAC prohibitions at issue are the same whether applied to cash or 
other types of transactions, but without dollar clearing, the direct causation 
issues involved in non-cash transactions would presumably disappear, as a 
U.S. financial institution need not be directly involved in the dollar clearing 
and settlement process. In the context of cash transactions, the export of fi-
nancial services to sanctioned parties or countries would become even more 
attenuated. Bringing an enforcement action against cash transactions would 
also be more difficult than against non-cash transactions due to the detection 
and traceability issues inherent in the use of cash. 
VI.  RECOMMENDATIONS AND POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVES 
A. Policy Goals Related to Restricting the Use of U.S. Dollars in 
Transactions with Sanctioned Parties 
 
Making the causation provisions consistent would be a useful way to make 
the causation provisions clearer and more coherent and to bring the text of the 
Syrian and Zimbabwean sanctions provisions in line with the other causation 
provisions. In deciding how the causation provisions should be made con-
sistent, however, the question arises: What are the policy goals of broad cau-
sation provisions and the TransTel settlement stance? Is it to spread U.S. sanc-
tions policy worldwide, to curtail the use of U.S. dollars in questionable 
international transactions, or both? The expansive causation language, and 
OFAC’s reliance on it and the theory of export of financial services to bring 
enforcement actions, serves to do both. As discussed in the Zarrab case, 
OFAC has the goal of “precluding transfers designed to dollarize transaction 
through the U.S. financial system for the direct or indirect benefit of Iranian 
banks or other persons in Iran or the Government of Iran.”221 With respect to 
Iran, it has been argued that threats with respect to the Iranian financial system 
include, for example, “proliferation financing, nuclear financing, missile fi-
nancing,” and also “terror financing, money laundering, and sanctions eva-
sion.”222 
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There are some limited circumstances in which OFAC allows U.S. finan-
cial institutions to be involved in the dollar clearing and settlement process 
that would otherwise be prohibited. For instance, in some instances U.S. fi-
nancial institutions may process transactions (called “U-turn” transactions) 
involving U.S. dollars that both originated and terminated outside of the 
U.S.223 Such exceptions, however, are few. The general rule applies that U.S. 
financial institutions may not be involved, however indirectly, in transactions 
with parties subject to U.S. sanctions. 
This Article explores, in the following sections, both the options of entirely 
expansive and entirely limited causation provisions. It recognizes, however, 
that OFAC is far more likely to universally adopt the expansive language were 
the office to amend the causation provisions, given OFAC’s goals, priorities, 
and use of the expansive causation provision in prior enforcement actions. 
Moreover, amending the limited causation provisions rather than the more ex-
pansive ones would entail far fewer changes to the actual text of the sanctions 
regulations themselves. Therefore, this Article recommends that the instances 
of limited causation language within the OFAC sanctions programs relating 
to Syria and Zimbabwe be amended to the broader form of the causation pro-
vision.   
 
B. Making All “Causing a Violation” Provisions Expansive 
 
The course of action recommended by this Article is to strike the language 
limiting prohibited transactions to those by U.S. persons or within the United 
States, thereby making the causation provisions found in the Syrian and Zim-
babwean OFAC sanctions programs expansive ones. This approach has the 
advantage of simplicity and would allow non-U.S. actors to have a consistent 
set of expectations as to the permitted uses of U.S. dollars. This would also 
have the advantage of making all instances of the causation provisions align 
with how expansively OFAC has used the prohibition against the exportation 
of services to sanctioned areas or persons. Where the exportation of services 
from the United States or by U.S. parties is construed broadly and may also 
include the use of offshore payment systems, it may be confusing that the 
causation provisions themselves appear to be limited. Therefore, while the 
causation provisions by themselves might not necessarily fully indicate the 
scope of restrictions on and applicability of U.S. sanctions to U.S. dollar-de-
nominated transactions that are not made within the United States or by U.S. 
persons, there will at least not be causation language found in the Syrian or 
Zimbabwean sanctions programs that indicates that causation violations are 
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limited to actions taken within the United States or by U.S. persons. Such 
limited causation language might have the effect of creating a mistaken im-
pression that the sanctions regulations do not necessarily attach to U.S. dollar-
denominated transactions when such transactions do not meet the criteria of 
the limited causation provision.   
As described above, U.S. dollar transactions do in fact appear to involve a 
U.S. party, however tangentially or in a minimal role, at some point in the 
dollar clearing and settlement process. The adoption of broad causation lan-
guage across all U.S. sanctions programs would therefore have the advantage 
of clarity for foreign entities. Under this approach, quite simply, transactions 
involving U.S. dollars should not be entered into with parties sanctioned by 
OFAC, in order to avoid causing a U.S. financial institution to violate the 
sanctions regulations and thereby triggering a sanctions violation by the for-
eign entity itself. This also would make the causation provisions consistent 
with an expansive interpretation of the export of financial services, as OFAC 
has used in past enforcement actions. 
As mentioned above, the broad causation language that appears within the 
text of the sanctions regulations does not by itself necessarily indicate the full 
applicability of U.S. sanctions, especially where parties outside of the United 
States might not expect U.S. sanctions regulations to apply. If broad causation 
language were universally adopted across sanctions programs, OFAC would 
do well to publicize this development widely, along with its already-existing 
prohibition on the export of financial services, and clearly and publicly state 
that these terms effectively mean a blanket prohibition against the use of U.S. 
dollars with sanctioned entities and individuals, whether or not such transac-
tions are made by the United States or non-U.S. parties. OFAC has recently 
made a positive step in its Compliance Framework making clearer its re-
strictions against the use of U.S. dollars in sanctioned transactions;224 OFAC 
should continue this trend with future publications and announcements. More-
over, this Article recommends that when the broad causation provisions are 
used as the basis for enforcement actions, OFAC should specifically identify 
the nature of the sanctions violation caused–for example, the involvement of 
U.S. financial institutions in the dollar clearing and settlement process. 
 
C. Making All “Causing a Violation” Provisions Limited 
 
The “causing a violation” provisions could also all be amended to the lim-
ited form of the causation language, to reach only parties within the United 
States or actions taken within the United States. This change would limit 
OFAC’s reach to those dollar transactions with a clear U.S. nexus, instead of 
relying on the sometimes-unclear involvement of U.S. financial institutions in 
the dollar clearing and settlement process as the basis for OFAC jurisdiction. 
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This change might also be in line with the original intent of the drafters of the 
causation provisions, as discussed in Part I of this Article. This change, how-
ever, might not have great practical effect; OFAC could charge the same type 
of conduct based on a theory of exportation of financial services, much as it 
has in the other enforcement actions besides TransTel described in Part II of 
this Article. Such an amendment of the causation provisions to appear more 
limited might cause foreign entities to mistakenly conclude that the U.S. sanc-
tions laws and regulations do not apply to their U.S. dollar transactions with 
sanctioned entities, instead of recognizing that such transactions could be pe-
nalized through a theory of export of financial services from the United States. 
Adopting entirely limited causation provisions would also suffer from the dif-
ficulty of defining the nature of boundaries of the “transaction” that must oc-
cur within the United States or be taken by a U.S. person to be penalized for 
triggering a sanctions violation. 
This Article therefore recommends that the causation provisions be 
amended so that they are all expansive in nature, rather than being all limited. 
This approach would make the causation regulations with the fewest changes 
to the text of the regulatory language. This approach would also best reflect 
that OFAC currently has the ability to reach U.S. dollar-denominated transac-
tions made outside of the United States without direct involvement of U.S. 
persons, and would therefore not contribute to any mistaken impression that 
the sanctions regulations did not apply to such transactions. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
OFAC’s use of the broad causation provisions, and alternatively the pro-
hibitions against the export of services to sanctioned parties or countries, ef-
fectively attaches the U.S. sanctions regulations to all U.S. dollar-denomi-
nated transactions effected through dollar clearing and settlement systems, 
whether those transactions were entered into by U.S. parties or within the 
United States. The provisions prohibit the use of U.S. dollars with any sanc-
tioned party where the U.S. dollar is used. The use of the broad causation 
provision by OFAC in TransTel to reach a U.S. dollar-denominated transac-
tion entered into outside of the U.S. by non-U.S. parties was novel in that a 
broad causation provision was used to reach such conduct, but not in the sense 
that OFAC was penalizing types of transactions that had not previously been 
subject to OFAC enforcement actions. 
As this Article discusses, the TransTel settlement involved the novel use 
of the broad causation provision because those broad causation provisions did 
not appear to have been developed with the expectation that they would apply 
to non-U.S. parties or to transactions outside the United States. Indeed, based 
on the language in the Federal Register discussing the North Korean sanc-
tions, the broad causation language perhaps was intended to have the same 
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jurisdictional reach as the limited causation language specifically referencing 
actions taken by U.S. persons or within the United States. However, the fa-
cially expansive text of the broad causation provisions, and the broad general 
intended scope of the IEEPA statute to protect the interests of the United 
States, mean that the extraterritorial reach of the broad causation provisions is 
likely to survive any challenge based on legislative history. An argument that 
OFAC does not have the authority to enforce the broad causation principles 
extraterritorially in their current form is likely to fail. Although a difference 
in the causation principles across OFAC programs may not have been in-
tended, one has arisen. Therefore, the more relevant issue is whether and how 
these provisions should be amended across sanctions programs in the future. 
This Article concludes that the prohibitions against “causing a violation” 
should be made consistent across OFAC sanctions programs in order to allow 
actors to develop a clear set of expectations around the use of U.S. dollars by 
transactions with U.S.-sanctioned parties entered into either by U.S. or non-
U.S. entities. Given OFAC’s history in bringing enforcement actions based on 
the export of financial services, this Article recommends that all of the causa-
tion provisions be amended to be consistent with the broad version of that 
language, in order to avoid the impression that only transactions within the 
United States or by U.S. persons are subject to OFAC enforcement when they 
could also be pursued instead based on the alternative theory of export of fi-
nancial services. 
If OFAC intends in the future to take a position consistent with the 
TransTel settlement that all transactions with U.S.-sanctioned parties using 
U.S. dollars violate the sanctions provisions, whether entered into by U.S. or 
non-U.S. parties, then that stance should be widely publicized in a clear and 
consistent manner. Clarity and ease in developing effective compliance 
measures, as well as the advancement of the goals of U.S. sanctions programs, 
are the primary goals of adopting broad causation provisions across all U.S. 
sanctions programs. OFAC can further promote those goals by widely dis-
seminating information about the effect of such causation provisions, and the 
prohibitions on the export of financial services, on the application of U.S. 
sanctions to transactions involving U.S. dollars. 
 
